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In the Global Market for Justice:
Who is Paying the Highest Price
for Judicial Independence?
The greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful
and a sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent judiciary.

Chief Justice John Marshall
Virginia State Convention in 1829
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Judicial elections are becoming "nastier, noisier, and costlier, ' 2 the
very thing Chief Justice John Marshall feared when he warned colonialists
of an "ignorant," "corrupt," or "dependent" judiciary. As many states elect
their judges, they continually make the judiciary dependent on public
opinion. This dependence on public opinion is not without its costs, as
elected judiciaries are becoming subject to highly politicized and expensive
campaigns, heightened scrutiny, and an unpredictable public that can rain
down their wrath at any moment.
Examples of "nastier, noisier, and costlier" elections can be seen at
every turn. For example, noisier elections are evidenced by the increased
politicization of the courts.3 In the new age of endless media, the public has
taken an increased interest in the judiciary, and especially its decisions. In
1. John Marshall, Speech on Dec. 11, 1829, in PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-30, at 616 (1830).
2.
Roy A. Schotland, Comment, adapted from remarks at Bulwarks of the
Republic: Judicial Independence and Accountability in the American System of Justice
(Dec. 1999), in 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 150 (1998) [hereinafter Schotland,
Judicial Independence and Accountability].
3.

JUSTICE INJEOPARDY 14-15 (American Bar Association ed., 2003).
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the areas of criminal justice 4 and tort reform,5 for example, the public not
only scrutinizes the judiciary, but also reports (and sometimes skews) its
decisions in order to support or oppose a judicial candidate in the next
election. Other areas of law have also caused judicial elections to be
''noisier" as courts continue to adjudicate heavily politicized social issues.
Courts regularly decide issues with regard to abortion, criminal defendant
rights, toxic tort litigation, environmental policy, and civil rights, all
bringing out strong emotions
in the public, with stronger reactions from
6
groups.
interest
special
In addition to being "noisier," judicial campaigns have also gotten
much "costlier." The first million-dollar election was seen in the mid1980s and since then costs have continued to skyrocket.7 The cost of
running for state supreme court has increased from $237,281 in 1986 in
Alabama to $2,080,000 in 1996,8 while in Ohio costs "rose from $100,000
in 1980 to over $2.7 million in 1986." 9 Pennsylvania has seen parallel
increases: a campaign in 1987 cost $523,000, but reached $2.8 million in
1995.10 These costs of judicial races are borne not only by the candidates
themselves, but also by lawyers, business interests, and political parties as
4.
In California, three justices were opposed in their retention elections because of
their stand on the death penalty. Kyle D. Cheek & Anthony Champagne, PartisanJudicial
Elections: Lessons from a Bellwether State, 39 WiLLAMETrE L. REV. 1357, 1365 (2003).
The three justices spent over $4 million in connection with the election, but were opposed by
over $6 million from special interest groups, eventually causing all three justices to lose their
positions. Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for
Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHl-.-KENT. L. Rev. 133, 136
(1998). Many judges continue to run these "tough on crime" campaigns, trying to appease
the demanding public, which led one Nevada justice to comment: "judges are supposed to be
judging crimes not fighting it." Schotland, Judicial Independence and Accountability, supra
note 2, at 150.
5.
One example was Ohio Supreme Court Justice Alice Resnick, who was opposed
by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in a multi-million dollar campaign. Judge Resnick had
earlier taken part in a decision that overturned tort-reform legislation as being unconstitutional. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has continued to get involved in many judicial
elections, supporting those candidates that are sympathetic to pro-business interests and
favorable to tort-reform. The Ohio Chamber of Commerce spent about $4 million on issue
advertisements opposing Justice Resnick. The United States Chamber of Commerce spent
another $1-2 million on the anti-Resnick campaign. To counter the Chamber ads, a coalition
of trial lawyers and unions spent another $1,524,000. Roy A. Schotland, FinancingJudicial
Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 849, 875-76 (2001).
6.
Id.
7.
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Through the Lens of Diversity: The Fight for Judicial
Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 10 MICH. J. RACE. & L. 55, 93
(2004).
8.
Charles Gardner Geyh, Publicly FinancedJudicialElections: An Overview, 34
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1467, 1468 (2001).
9. Id.
10.
Id.
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the primary contributors to judicial campaigns. 1 The threats to independence and impartiality are pervasive from these "costlier" elections as one
can easily imagine how likely it is that the same lawyer will appear in front
of the judge to whose campaign he contributed. Business interests and
activist groups are just as likely to threaten independence as they will also
appear before the very judges that received their campaign contributions.
Finally, judicial elections have become "nastier," often leading the
American public to lose faith in its court system. Campaigns are no longer
based on judicial qualifications, but rather on smear campaigns that often
distort a judge's record. A national survey conducted in 1999 found that
public trust and confidence in the judiciary fell below the confidence people
had in other government institutions. 12 The same survey also found that
eighty-one percent (81%) of respondents believed judges were influenced
by politics, and that eighty percent (80%) believed wealthy people were
treated better than others by the courts. Nearly fifty percent (50%) of
respondents believed that minorities receive worse treatment than others
from the courts. 13
With these problems continually plaguing judicial elections, it is remarkable that states chose to elect their judges in the first place.1 4 An
examination of the historical debate over judicial selection provides a
foundation for examining the competing interests inherent in selecting
judges. The colonists were first introduced to judicial selection through
King George II. He appointed judges to serve during his pleasure, leading
to a sort of "telephone justice"'15 where the King dictated the outcome he
desired in any given case and removed those judges who did not rule in his
favor. 16 The colonists were so angered by this system and its offense to
justice that they listed the judiciary's lack of independence with the
complaints contained in the Declaration of Independence.1 7 As a result, the
Phyllis Williams Kotey, Public Financing for Non-Partisan Judicial
11.
Campaigns: Protecting Judicial Independence While Ensuring Judicial Impartiality, 38

AKRON L. REv. 597, 616 (2005).
Peter A. Joy, A ProfessionalismCreedfor Judges: Leading By Example, 52 S.C.
12.
L. REv. 667, 672 (2001).
Id.
13.
For an extensive history of judicial selection development, see F. Andrew
14.
Hanssen, Learning About Judicial Independence: InstitutionalChange in the State Courts,
33 J.LEGAL STUD. 431, 440-53 (2004).
"Telephone justice" is often described as "taking instructions from the party
15.
boss" who simply makes a call to the judge in charge and orders his desired result. David
Tolbert & Andrew Solomon, United Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in
Post-ConflictSocieties, 19 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 29, 53 (2006).
Cheek & Champagne, supra note 4, at 1357.
16.
17.
Kotey, supra note 11, at 600 (stating that King George III "has made judges
dependent on his will alone, for tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their
salaries..." citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776)).
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Founding Fathers had to look somewhere other than their motherland for a
model of judicial selection that would ensure the independence of the
judiciary.
In the theoretical battle that ensued over judicial selection, Charles de
Secondat Baron de Montesquieu, one of the original designers of the
American government's system of checks and balances and tripartite
government, joined William Blackstone in arguing that judges should be
elected. 18 Thomas Jefferson also argued for some form of accountability,
arguing that judges should be appointed for limited terms and then subject
to reappointment or retention elections.1 9 Alexander Hamilton, on the other
hand, pursued a judiciary that was completely independent from the will of
the majority. 2° He stated that placing the power to select the judiciary with
the people would be problematic because
there would be "too great a
21
disposition to consult the popularity.",
Hamilton won the intellectual battle when the federal government
decided to appoint judges with life tenure and protected salaries.2 Five of
the original states followed the federal government by giving the governor
the power to appoint and the legislative body the power to approve.23 The
other eight original states gave appointment power exclusively to the
legislative body. 24 Approval of the appointment process did not last long,
however, as people grew dissatisfied with the judiciary. In the early 1800's
people grew dissatisfied with federal judges such as John Marshall, who
was a Federalist in the midst of dominating Jeffersonians.25 President
Jackson himself disliked the judiciary, whom he called "politicians who
hide their politics under their robes. 2 6 The rise of "Jacksonian democracy"
led to cries for a more accountable judiciary. The states met this cry for
accountability by making the judiciary directly dependent on the public
through judicial elections.
18.
Hon. Peter Paul Olszewski, Sr., Who's Judging Whom? Why PopularElections
are Preferableto Merit Selection Systems, 109 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1, 3 (2004).
19.
Troy A. Eid, Judicial Independence and Accountability: The Case Against
Electing Judges, 30 CoLo. LAW. 71, 71 (2001).
20.
THE FEDERAUST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Tudor Pub. 1937).
21.
Id.
22.
See U.S. CONST. art. m11,
§1, for life tenure and salary provisions. For federal
judicial appointment, see U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
23.
Madame Justice Sandra Schultz Newman & Daniel Mark Isaacs, Historical
Overview of the Judicial Selection Process in the United States: Is the Electoral System in
Pennsylvania Unjustified?, 49 ViiL. L. REv. 1, 9 (2004). One reason for the original states
adopting an appointment method of selecting justices may be that they simply knew of no
other way to select judges. See Cheek & Champagne, supra note 4, at 1358.
24.
Newman & Isaacs, supra note 23; Olszewski, supra note 18, at 3.
25.
Cheek & Champagne, supra note 4, at 1358.
26. Eid, supra note 19, at 71.
27.
Ifill, supra note 7, at 73.
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Mississippi became the first state to elect all of its judges by popular
election.28 Within fourteen years of New York and Iowa switching to the
popular election of judges, twenty more states moved from appointment to
election. 29 As the Civil War began, twenty-four of thirty-four states were
selecting their judges through popular elections.3 ° In the late 19t Century,
developments in selection systems led to the adoption of non-partisan
elections, where the judicial candidate was not identified by party affiliation
on the ballot. 3' Twelve states were choosing their judges using nonpartisan elections by 1927,32 although three states tried non-partisan
elections and rejected them. 33 States continued to try variations of selection
systems, combining
popular elections with appointments to form "merit
' 34
selection.
Although states have continued to adapt their selection systems, as
long as they rely on some form of election, the contests will continue to get
"nastier, nosier, and costlier," showing the need for reform. This comment
will survey foreign countries and their judicial selection systems to examine
alternatives to the current selection methods utilized by the states. Part I
lays a foundation with which to examine judicial selection systems by
defining independence, impartiality, and their intersection with accountability, along with examining constitutionalism concerns and diversity issues.
Part II surveys the current selection methods used by the states and the
various regulations in place concerning judicial selection. Part In examines
the problems created by the various selection systems and proposed
solutions to those problems. Judicial selection methods used by foreign
countries are categorized and explored in Part IV, with an alternative
selection method for the judiciary proposed in Part V.
I.

FOUNDATIONS

In order to properly analyze the judicial selection methods of foreign
states, it is necessary to understand the concepts that drive each country in
28.
Cheek & Champagne, supra note 4, at 1359; Eid, supra note 19, at 71; but see
Olszewski, supra note 18, at 3-4. ("In 1812, Georgia went beyond simply granting the
legislature the right to select judges, becoming the first state to adopt popular elections as a
means of choosing judges.").
29.
Ofer Raban, Judicial Impartiality and the Regulation of Judicial Election
Campaigns, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205, 206-07 (2004).
30. Id. at 207.
31.
Cheek & Champagne, supra note 4, at 1359.
32.
Id.
33.
The states rejected non-partisan elections because politics were still involved in
elections, only hidden now from voters' eyes, making the voters even less knowledgeable
about the candidates. Id.
34.
Discussed infra at pp. 460-62.
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choosing its judges. Countries have consistently tried to balance two main
concepts - accountability and independence - in selecting judges.
Additionally, states consider whether judges are impartial, whether the
public has confidence in its courts, and whether individual rights are being
protected. These concepts are not only the foundation for judicial selection
systems; they also differentiate judicial elections from those of the other
branches, demonstrating the need for a unique selection system for judges.
Generally, judicial independence is about connections - or lack thereof
- between the judiciary and other influences, both political and social.3 5
Most scholars divide judicial independence into two concepts: decisional
independence and institutional independence.3 6 Institutional independence
can best be described as insularity from the other political branches of
government; judges being free to decide cases without fear of retribution
from the executive or legislative branches.37 Institutional independence is
the essential feature of the checks and balances designed by the Founding
Fathers to ensure that the judiciary would be able to exercise its power in
overturning legislative or executive acts that were unconstitutional.38
Institutional independence was established firmly in this country by Chief
Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison39 when Marshall established
the judiciary as a co-equal branch of the federal government that was
independent from the other branches.4n
Institutional independence is extremely important to a functioning
judiciary; however, decisional independence may be more important to a
rule of law society.4 1 Decisional independence is the judge's ability to
decide each case free from improper influences, based solely on the law and

35.

Peter H. Russell, Toward a General Theory, in

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE INTHE

2 (Peter H.
Russell & David M. O'Brien eds., 2001).
36.
Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Judicial Independence as a Campaign Platform,
84 MICH. B.J. 40, 41 (2005). Others define independence as having three interrelated
concepts: behavioral or decisional independence, formal or institutional independence
(tenure, salary, selection methods), and insularity from other political branches. Ryan L.
Souders, A Gorilla at the Dinner Table: PartisanJudicial Elections in the United States, 25
REv. LMG. 529, 532 (2006).
37.
Another author considers institutional independence not only insularity from the
executive and legislative branches, but also insularity from other public and private entities.
Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere, Judicial Independence and the Minority Jurist: The Shining
Example of Chief Justice Robert N.C. Nix, Jr., 78 TEMP. L. REv. 379, 380 (2005).
38.
Id.
39.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
40.
Janet Stidman Eveleth, Preserving Our JudicialIndependence, 37 MD. B.J. 58,
60 (2004).
41.
Iheukwumere, supra note 37, at 380.
AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITcAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 1,
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the applicable facts.42 It is decisional independence that one would equate
more with impartiality or neutrality, an essential promise of the law.4 3
Improper influences that would diminish decisional independence if used in
a judge's determination of the outcome include the identity of the litigants,
popularity of the issues presented, and repercussions for the judge,
personally and professionally."
It is easy to see that judicial impartiality flows directly from judicial
indeendence; 45 some even say judicial independence is judicial impartiality.
Impartiality is considered such a necessary precondition to the
administration of justice that is has been a primary concern from the writing
of the Bible to the founding of the United Nations. The United Nations
considers impartiality so fundamental that they list it as a basic human
right.47 In the Old Testament, Moses commanded his people: "Appoint

judges and officials for each of your tribes .

.

. and they shall judge the

people fairly. Do not pervert justice or show partiality. 48 Americans have
not missed the importance of impartiality either, as the Supreme Court has
held that impartiality is so important that even an appearance of bias
violates a litigant's due process rights.49
Although considered a fundamental right, defining "impartiality" in
the judicial context has often been difficult. 50

The dictionary defines

42.
Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Making JudicialIndependence a Campaign Issue,
78 Wis. LAW. 17, 18 (2005).

43.
"The law makes a promise - neutrality. If the promise gets broken, the law as
we know it ceases to exist." Id. (quoting Anthony M. Kennedy, Bulwarks of the Republic:
Judicial Independence and Accountability in the American System of Justice. Address at the
ABA Symposium (Dec. 4-5, 1998)).
44.
Souders, supra note 36, at 534.
45.
Eveleth, supra note 40, at 60.
46.
Judge Malcolm H. Mackey, A Threat to ImpartialJustice:Judges Must be Free
to Enforce the Law Without Fearof PoliticalRetribution, 23 L.A. LAW. 68, 68 (2000).
47.
In the United Nation's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article X
provided that "everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal..." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217(A)(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. doc. A/810 (December 10, 1948).
48.

Deuteronomy 16:18-19 (New International Version).

49.
Ifill, supra note 7, at 76. See e.g., In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)
(holding that disqualification of judges is sometimes necessary in order to preserve the
appearance of justice where no actual bias is present).
50. The American Bar Association and most state codes do not define impartiality.
This came to be one of Justice Scalia's complaints in his analysis of judicial conduct codes
in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White. In the absence of an adequate definition he
proposed three: (1) lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding; (2) lack of
preconception in favor of or against a particular legal view or issue; (3) open-mindedness.
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 770, 775-78 (2002).
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"impartial" as "not partial or biased; unprejudiced., 51 One author defines
impartiality as ensuring that "legal cases are decided on the facts and the
law, without influence from such outside forces as public opinion, politics,
or special interest groups. 5 2 Another defines it as the ability of any
litigant, regardless of race, gender, age, creed, or national origin, to obtain
fair and impartial justice.53
Several factors need to be considered when trying to ensure judicial
impartiality. The first is providing judges with both decisional and
institutional independence so that they can adjudicate impartially without
the fear of retribution. Additionally, judges need to be open-minded and
committed to the rule of law. A final consideration is the role of diversity
in the judiciary. Judicial impartiality is more than just a lack of bias toward
a litigant; it is a structural dimension affecting the bench as a whole.54
Racial and gender diversity on the bench ensures that competing perspectives of a community are represented.5 5 An analogy can be drawn to the
petit jury: defendants do not have a right to a jury made up of people with
the same race or gender, but they do have a right to a pool of jurors that is
diverse.5 6 Similarly, parties before the bench have a right to a pool of
judges that is diverse, like the jury venire, but not necessarily a right to a
judge of a specific race or gender. 57 Because a diverse bench is a fundamental right and thus one of "constitutional dimension,',,58 every jurisdiction
that rethinks its judicial selection method needs to consider the effects the
change will have on the diversity of the bench.59
If judicial independence and impartiality are on one side of the scale,
then the accountability of the judiciary is on the other side. The debate
ensuing since the early 19'h century has been how to effectively balance
both the accountability and independence of the judiciary. The ideas of
accountability and independence are directly at odds with each other
because an independent judiciary is accountable to no one.6 0 People argue
that there can be too much judicial independence; since judges are
government officials who exercise plenary power, they should be account51.

(2000).

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,

4th

Edition

52.
Eveleth, supra note 40, at 59.
53.
Iheukwumere, supra note 37, at 379.
54.
Ifil, supra note 7, at 81.
55.
Id. at 82.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 90.
59.
Id. at 84. Those states subject to section four of the Voting Rights Act also need
prior approval in order to change their judicial selection method. See infra notes 152-156
and accompanying text.
60.
Russell, supra note 35, at 2; Souders, supra note 36, at 531.
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able to the public. 6 ' Although it can be argued that judges are accountable
to one another through appellate courts, some will 62say that this is not
enough; judges must also be accountable to the public.
Pivotal in the early development of the American judiciary, accountability has continued to be the motivating factor for many changes to the
selection of the judiciary. One such change that has been proposed in South
Dakota and Montana is a constitutional amendment providing for the recall
of judges for any reason.6 3 The amendment, named "JAL" for "Judicial
Accountability Initiative Law," allows people to file a recall petition for any
reason, without regard to the judge's good-faith efforts to perform their
office in accordance with the law.64 The proposed Montana amendment
reads, "The justification statement is sufficient if it sets forth any reason
acknowledging electoral dissatisfaction with a judge or justice notwithstanding good faith attempts to perform the duties of office. 6 5
The supporters of these constitutional amendments forget that accountability is already built into our system in many ways. A recall option
to remove judges is unnecessary and superfluous because judges can
already be removed through impeachment. 66 Additionally, a judge who
violates principles of independence by taking bribes or promising to
exchange favors can be reprimanded through both criminal and impeachment processes. 67 Other accountability measures are also already in place,
such as when a judge is overruled by an appellate court for applying the law
incorrectly. 68 Another example is the recusal remedies for when a judge is
biased or appears to be biased. 69 Additionally, if the public is unhappy with
the law judges are making or the way they are interpreting the law, the
public can exercise their rights through the political process and change the
current law.7 ° If the constitution is flawed, the public can petition the
61.
PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETfHCS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 7-8 (American Judicature Society 1990).

62.
Paul D. Carrington, Big Money in Texas JudicialElections: The Sickness and Its
Remedies, 53 SMU L. REV. 263, 265 (2000). One judge believes that when "accountability"
is used in the context of the judiciary, people really mean they want the judge to rule the way
they would rule, in favor of their issues. Judge Peter D. Webster, Who Needs an Independent Judiciary?,78 FLA. B.J. 24, 26 (2004).
63.
Keith B. Norman, Do Americans Want an Independent Judiciary?, 67 ALA.
LAW. 238, 239 (2006).

64.
Id. These amendments were successfully defeated in all states where they were
on the November 2006 ballot. Molly McDonough and Debra Cassens Weiss, Huge Defeat

for 'JAIL 4 Judges:' Female JudicialCandidates Win Big, A.B.A. J., November 9, 2006.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Norman, supra note 63, at 239.
Id.
JUSTICE INJEOPARDY, supra note 3, at 12.
Id.
Id. at2.
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legislature to amend it, without any review by the judiciary. 7 The federal
government and its Founding Fathers did not grant federal judges unlimited
independence; they built in their own methods of accountability, thereby
making additional measures of accountability unnecessary.
The concepts of independence, impartiality, and accountability need a
final dimension added before the judiciary can be fully analyzed, constitutionalism. In our unique system of government, democracy is not absolute;
it is balanced by concerns of constitutionalism. 72 Constitutionalism is the
tempering of the will of the majority in order to protect the rights of
minorities.7 3 These rights are contained in the federal Constitution and the
various state constitutions. The rights are meaningless, however, unless an
independent judiciary upholds them.74
Just as independence can go too far, too much accountability can be
dangerous as it is the role of the judiciary to protect individual rights for
which independence is necessary. In Alexander Hamilton's famous work
of the judiciary, The Federalist No. 78, one of our Founding Fathers stated:
"This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which
... have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in
the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community. ' '75 The protection of individuals, minorities, and groups lacking
political or financial power goes to the very core of the judiciary's
76
obligations as a branch of government. They are the branch that is not
fully accountable to the majority's will, as opposed to the other branches,
because of their responsibility to protect our "sacred rights." As the public
clamors for more accountability, it is essential to consider what effect
increased accountability will have on the judiciary's ability to protect
minority rights. Current selection methods beg the question: can justices
elected by the majority successfully protect minority rights, which are often
unpopular? 77 When examining alternative judicial selection methods it is
imperative to consider whether the judiciary we select can, and will, protect
minority rights.
The independence and accountability of the judiciary, which is directly
affected by its selection system, directly affects the public confidence in the
courts. Public confidence in the judiciary is vital to its functioning as it
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.
1937).
76.
77.

Id.

Newman & Isaacs, supra note 23, at 16.
Id.
Eveleth, supra note 40, at 58-59.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 103 (Alexander Hamilton) (Tudor Publishing ed.,
Webster, supra note 62, at 27.
Newman & Isaacs, supra note 23, at 16-17.
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controls neither "the purse" nor "the sword., 78 The judiciary cannot levy
taxes, it cannot maintain armed forces, and it cannot coerce obedience to its
holdings; 79 and so the very existence of the rule of law is dependent on
public confidence because the public will not support institutions in which
they have no confidence. 80 The effects on public confidence in the
judiciary need to be considered with every selection system because if large
segments of the population lose faith in the judiciary, "justice is in very
serious trouble., 81 Accordingly, another consideration of any selection
system is its effect on diversity because public confidence in the judiciary is
not only affected by the judiciary's independence and accountability, but
also by its diversity.8 2 Especially within communities of color, the diversity
of the judiciary is important, otherwise the legitimacy of the courts is
undermined.
Finally, it is important to remember that judges are fundamentally
different from other government officials and therefore their respective
selection should reflect those differences. At the 1846 Constitutional
Convention, a delegate who would later become Chief Justice stated that
the judiciary "represents no man, no majority, no people. It represents the
written law of the land .. ,,84 The fundamental difference between the
judiciary and other political actors is that judges are not representatives.
They do not serve any constituency or advance the interests of any
particular community. 85 In fact, judges are supposed to insulate themselves
from outside influences such as political action groups and campaign
money.86 Political actors on the other hand are expected to represent the
people. Governors and legislators are advocates and are rewarded for
advancing a particular interest throughout their work.87 Instead of
insulating themselves from public opinion, legislators are expected to let
public opinion dictate their decisions. Because of the differences between
the judiciary and other government officials, their respective selection
78. Id. at 2; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Courts have
neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment. If the public does not have confidence in
courts' judgment, then the legitimacy of courts as a democratic institution is endangered.").
79. Jason Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning Up Judicial Elections:
Examining the FirstAmendment Limitations on Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2 MICH. L.
& POL'Y REV. 71, 72 (1997).
80.

JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 3, at 10.

86.

See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(2) (2004).

81.
Id. at2.
82. Id. at 12.
83. Id. at 1.
84. Schotland, FinancingJudicialElections, supra note 5, at 851.
85. Hon. Randall T. Shepard, Electing Judges and the Impact on Judicial
Independence, 42 TENN. B.J. 23, 23 (2006).
87.

Schotland, FinancingJudicialElections, supra note 5, at 859.
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systems should be fundamentally different; however, the current trend is
toward symmetry.88
I.

STATE SELECTION METHODS AND THEIR REGULATION

Throughout history, states have experimented with a variety of selection methods; however, five selection methods have since emerged and
continue to dominate state selection systems, although some states tailor
each selection method to their individual needs.89 Currently, states employ
two types of appointment: legislative and gubernatorial; and two types of
elective systems: partisan and non-partisan. 90 Additionally, several states
select their judges using a "merit plan" that has two key components: a
judicial nominating commission and retention elections where candidates
run unopposed. 91 Using these five selection systems, states use components
from each to create their own unique selection systems.92
TABLE 1: STATE SELECTION METHODS
Appointment

93

Election

Governor

Legislature

Partisan
Elections

NonPartisan
Elections

Missouri
Plan

Variations

Delaware*

Rhode
Island*

Alabama

Georgia

Alaska

California*

South
Colin
Carolina1

Arkansas

Idaho

Arizona

Connecticut*

Maine

88.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Republic Party of Minnesota v. White,
which overturned the ABA Model Code's announce clause, judicial elections are becoming
more and more like the elections of other political branches. Discussed infra pp. 464-67 and
accompanying notes.
89.
Paul J. De Muniz, Eroding the Public's Confidence in Judicial Impartiality:
First Amendment Federal Jurisprudence and Special Interest Financing of Judicial
Campaigns, 67 ALB. L. REV. 763, 763 (2004).
90.
Hanssen, supra note 14, at 431-32.
91.
Cheek & Champagne, supra note 4, at 1359.
92.
MCFADDEN, supra note 61, at 5-6. It is important to keep in mind that many
judges are appointed using vacancy provisions. One study reported that nationally, one-third
of judges are appointed to fill vacancies. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, supra
note 5, at 853.
93.
This table is compiled from information provided in the appendix of LYLE
WARRICK, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS,

(American Judicature Society 2d ed. 1993). Those states with an (*) next to them have their
own variation on the selection method listed; more information on these states is provided in
Appendix One at pp. 492-94.
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TABLE

1:

STATE SELECTION METHODS

93

Election

Appointment
Governor

Legislature

Partisan
Elections

Missouri
Plan

Variations

New
Jersey

NonPartisan
Elections

Virginia

Illinois*

Kentucky

Colorado

Massachusetts*

South
Dakota*

Louisiana

Michigan

Florida

New
Hampshire*

Vermont*

Mississippi

Minnesota

Hawaii

New
ew
Mexico*

North

Montana

Indiana*

New York*

Pennsylvania*

Nevada

Iowa

Tennessee*

Nrh
Dakota

Kansas

Texas

Ohio

Maryland

Oregon

Missouri

Washington

Nebraska

Wisconsin

Oklahoma*

Carolina

West

Virginia

Utah
Wyoming

The president appoints all federal judges; however, few states follow
the federal trend and use a purely appointive selection system. As
discussed supra,9 4 all the original states began by appointing their judges,
but during the unrest of the Jacksonian period of popular democracy, many
states began electing their judges. Currently only eight states employ some
kind of appointive selection system. 95 Three states appoint judges after the
94.
95.

Discussed supra pp. 447-49.
See Table 1, supra pp. 456-57.
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96
legislature votes on them: Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia;
five states use gubernatorial appointment: Delaware, Maine, New Jersey,
South Dakota, and Vermont.97 Those states appointing their judges
generally believe the only way to ensure judicial independence is through
appointment. This way judges will not be prone to the pressures of a
changing electorate's opinion. 98 Although appointment ensures judicial
independence, many people associate appointment with a lack of accountability.
While the minority of states appoint their judges, the vast majority of
states elect their judges. 99 Nationally, over eighty-seven percent (87%) of
all judges face some kind of election in thirty-nine states. 1°° States
generally employ three different types of elections: partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, and uncontested retention elections (as part of the
Missouri Plan). As Table 1 shows, ten states use partisan elections for most
or all of their judiciary while twelve states use non-partisan elections to
elect part or all of their judiciary. Even in states that employ elections,
however, most judges still reach the10 1bench by appointment in order to fill
vacancies during midterm elections.
States initially used partisan elections, where a judicial candidate's
party affiliation is listed on the ballot. 10 2 To curb voters from voting strictly
based on party affiliation, states introduced non-partisan elections where the

96.
See Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia in WARRICK, supra note 93; see
also Chief Justice Joseph E. Lambert, Contestable Judicial Elections: Maintaining
Respectability in the Pose-White Era, 94 Ky. L. J. 1, 2 (2005).
97.
WARRICK, supra note 93.
Jason J. Czarnezki, A Callfor Change: Improving Judicial Selection Methods,
98.
89 MARQ. L. REv. 169, 176 (2005). In fact, because empirical evidence shows that judges
change their voting patterns when elections near, some commentators argue that all judges
should be appointed. Id. at 176-77. Appointed judges have been shown to rule more
consistently, which is a behavior that elected judges do not exhibit. Id. at 172.
99.
See Table 1 pp. 456-57. For a clear overview of the percentage of judges that
are elected and by which method, see Schotland, FinancingJudicialElections, supra note 5,
at 853.
100.
Abrahamson, JudicialIndependence as a Campaign Platform, supra note 36, at
41.
101.
One study found that eighty-five percent (85%) of California trial court judges
were initially appointed to fill vacancies. SusAN B. CARBON & LARRY C. BERKSON,
JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (American Judicature Society
1980).
102.
Some believe that partisan elections are merely a chance for voters to ratify the
decisions made by the party leadership because interested judicial candidates cannot even
obtain a place on the ballot without the endorsement of the party. CARBON & BERKSON,
supra note 101, at 14 ("The notion of direct popular expression of choice is, in effect, a
mirage.").
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ballot is silent on the candidate's party affiliation. 10 3 A few states have
experimented with "semi-partisan" election systems where candidates run
in extremely competitive partisan primary races, and then are listed on the
final ballot absent their party affiliation. 1°4 Michigan and Ohio both follow
this model and conduct non-partisan elections, but judicial candidates are
elected through highly partisan primaries. 0 5 Even though candidates
themselves are not supposed to announce their party affiliation, both the
Democratic and Republican parties mobilize on behalf of their judicial
candidates, ensuring that every voter knows the party affiliation of each
candidate. 1°6 Studies have shown that party affiliation is the best predictor
of outcome, and while states have tried to remove the intense political
campaigning from judicial elections, it still infects all judicial races. 10 7
People argue for judicial elections as being the most "democratic,"
"representative," and "efficient" method of selecting judges. 0 8 Others
argue that judges should be elected instead of appointed because of the
"plenary power" that judges possess. 1 9 Additionally, others argue that the
judiciary should be independent from other political branches but not the
public. Cleary these ideas conflict with the ideas of impartiality and
independence because if judges fear public recourse for their decisions,
they will not be adjudicating based on the law, but rather public opinion.
Proponents of elections also claim that popular elections of judges makes
courts more accessible to the public and that elections keep the public from
becoming disengaged with their legal system."l 0 Although the election of
judges is the most democratic form of selecting judges, proponents concede
that judicial elections will "not be foolproof, nor will it be perfect . . .
[because] the democratic process by its very nature, is anything but
perfect.""'

103.
Jessica Conser, Achievement of Judicial Effectiveness Through Limits on
Judicial Independence: A Comparative Approach, 31 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 255,
262-63 (2005).
104.
Ohio is the prime example of this where candidates cannot even announce their
party affiliation until after the primaries are over. Nancy Marion et al., Financing Ohio
Supreme Court Elections 1992-2002: Campaign Finance and JudicialSelection, 38 AKRON
L. REv. 567, 568 (2005).
105.
G. Alan Tarr, State JudicialSelection and JudicialIndependence, in 1 JUSTICE
IN JEOPARDY 2 (American Bar Association 2003).
106.
Id.
107.
Marion, supra note 104, at 573.
108.
Olszewski, supra note 18, at 12. Justice Olszewski in fact argues for the
adoption of elections for all states, including those that currently appoint their judges.
109.
CARBON & BERKSON, supra note 101, at 13.
110.
Souders, supra note 36, at 548; Olszewski, supra note 18, at 15.
111.
Olszewski, supra note 18, at 12.
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In order to balance independence and accountability better, states developed the "merit" or "Missouri" plan as a way to select judges. The
typical merit selection system involves two components: a judicial
nominating commission and retention elections.' 12 The main idea of merit
selection is that a non-partisan judicial nominating commission recruits and
evaluates judicial candidates. The commission then submits a list of
candidates to the governor, who appoints a judge from that list." 3 The
entire process is supposed to take place without regard to political
considerations or personal ideologies; the commission is supposed to
consider only abilities and qualifications.! 1 4 At the end of a judge's term,
he or she then runs in an uncontested race where the only question on the
ballot is "should Judge X be retained in office? '""5
California was the first state to adopt retention elections, but it did not
adopt a nominating commission for judges, the other component of the
traditional merit plan. 1 6 In 1934, California introduced retention elections,
but a Commission confirmed gubernatorial appointments, versus submitting
a list of nominees; a sort of "reverse-merit" plan. 1 7 Missouri was the first
state to adopt a true merit selection system, leading some commentators to
refer to the merit plan as the "Missouri Plan.""'
In 1937, the ABA
recommended that all states adopt the merit plan, but left the specific details
of the merit plan to each individual state."l 9 After Missouri adopted the
merit plan, other states followed suit, with twenty states adopting merit
selection by 1979.120 The states adopting merit selection seem satisfied
with their choice
because no state that has adopted merit selections has
12
abandoned it. '
The benefit advanced by many advocates of merit selection is that
independence and accountability are adequately balanced. 22 Independence
is preserved because judges are appointed and therefore do not have to cater
to public opinion. The judiciary is still accountable to the public through
retention elections, however, where the public can exercise its dissatisfaction for a particular judge. Additionally, because judges are rarely defeated
in retention elections, the incentive for special interest groups to spend large
112.
Cheek & Champagne, supra note 4, at 1359.
113. Id.
114.
Id.
115.
CARBON & BERKSON, supra note 101, at v.
116.
Id. at 11.
117.
Id.
118. Id.
119.
Id. at 4. The ABA continues to recommend the merit plan as the preferred
selection method for state judiciaries. Ifill, supra note 7, at 84.
120.
CARBON & BERKSON, supra note 101, at 11-12.
121.
Eid, supra note 19, at 72.
122.
Souders, supra note 36, at 570.
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amounts of money opposing a judge is reduced.123 Another benefit of merit
selection is the increase in the pool of competent candidates from which the
nominating commission can choose. 124 More judges will consider office if
they do not have to sacrifice huge amounts of time and money to be elected.
Finally, merit selection avoids the problems created by an uninformed
electorate who may be tempted 125
to elect judges based on political or social
issues rather than qualifications.
Several people criticize merit selection for removing politics from the
view of the public to behind closed doors. Members of the nominating
commission will only obtain their positions through some political process,
whether it be through election or appointment. 126 Obtaining membership on
these nominating commissions usually involves heavy campaigning
between opposing segments of the state's bar. 1 27 Once membership on the
commission is obtained, committee members have been known to fix their
list of nominees to ensure that their candidate has a chance for the judicial
office. 128 One tactic for fixing nominee lists is called "log-rolling" where
individual commission members make deals with other commission
members to support their choice of judicial nominee. 129 Another tactic is
"panel stacking" where the commission members choose their nominees in
a way that the governor has no real option in appointing a candidate he or
she desires.130 It is clear from these tactics that politics still infuse the
selection of the judiciary under the merit selection plan.
While problems can permeate nominating commissions, problems also
plague the retention election component of the merit plan. Although it has
been shown that judges rarely lose retention elections,' 3' that was not the
experience of three California Supreme Court Justices. 132 In 1986, Chief
Justice Rose Bird spent over $1.5 million in her retention election. 133 Two
other Supreme Court justices (Reynoso and Grodin) were subject to
retention that year and spent another combined $1.5 million on their
elections.134 Despite the large amount of money that was spent, all three

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 570-71.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 572.
Olszewski, supra note 18, at 8.
Cheek & Champagne, supra note 4, at 1361.
Id.
Olszewski, supra note 18, at 9.
Id.
Czarnezki, supra note 98, at 172.
Id.
Stuart Banner, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign

134.

Id.

Contributors,40 STAN. L. REv. 449, 454 (1988).
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justices lost their retention election. 135 The loss, in large part, can be
attributed to special interest groups that opposed the justices, most notably36
the group "Crime Victims for Court Reform," who spent over $7 million.
The huge amounts of money
spent in these retention elections shows that
13 7
justice can still be bought.
In each state's attempt to tailor judicial selection systems to their own
needs, many states have created variations on the primary selection
systems. Illinois and Pennsylvania put their own spin on partisan elections:
both states require judges to be elected in partisan elections, but after initial
selection judges are only subjected to retention elections. ' 8 New Hampshire puts its own variation on appointive selection. Judges in New
Hampshire are nominated by the governor and approved by a five-member
executive council; 39 however, the general population elects the executive
council. 40 When a judge's term expires, the judge must be nominated
by
4
the governor again and approved again by the executive council.' '
Most variations on selection systems, however, occur in the context of
merit systems. California uses a "reverse merit" system where the governor
recommends candidates to the Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation, comprised of thirty members who are appointed by the California Bar
Association.1 42 The Commission then rates those candidates who are later
confirmed by "the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, the
Attorney General, and the
Senior Presiding Judge of the court where the
143
serve."'
would
judge
new
Connecticut also puts its own spin on merit selection through its retention method. In Connecticut, the governor nominates a judge with the help
of a judicial selection commission and the general assembly appoints the
judge. 144 At the end of the judge's term, the Judicial Review Council
submits recommendations on the reappointment of the judge to the (1)
governor, (2) judicial selection commission, (3) standing committee on the
135.
Id. at 455.
136.
Id. Randall T. Shepard, JudicialIndependence and the Problem of Elections:
"We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us." 20 QuiNNIPtAc L. REv. 753, 756 (2001)
(describing other retention elections that have involved large amounts of money and strong
opposition to the judge seeking retention).
137.
CARBON & BERKSON, supra note 101, at 21. For a complete list of judges who
have not been retained and the reasons why they were not retained, see Id. at 26-27.
138.
Id. at 12. See also Appendix One at pp. 492-94.
139.
See generally N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 46.
140.
N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 60 (West 1997).
141.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §502-A:3 (West 1997).
142.
Eid, supra note 19, at 71-72.
143.
Id. at 72.
144.
CONN. CONST. ART. V §2; CONN. GEN. STAT. §2-40 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §51-44(a) (West 2005).
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judiciary of the Senate, and (4) standing committee on the judiciary in the
House of Representatives. 145 The judge is presumed to qualify for
reappointment, and it is the judicial selection commission who has the
burden of rebutting that presumption.'
New Mexico goes above and beyond other states and employs different components from all the major selection systems. First, judges are
appointed by the governor from a list of names provided by a judicial
nominating commission. 147
At the next general election following
appointment, the judge runs on a partisan ballot. 148 If the judge is successful, then the judge is subsequently subjected to non-partisan retention
ballots. 149 New Mexico's unique take on judicial selection insulates judges
from outside influences at the initial selection period, but then subjects
judges to a scrupulous public at the first chance. With a scant record at the
time of the first partisan election, the chance of misrepresentation of the
judge's true qualifications is high. While the public may have some
information on the judge's qualifications, the public will be more likely to
vote based on party affiliation.
The reality of state judicial selection is that no one system will work
for all states. When considering a selection method, a state needs to
balance the conflicting ideas of independence and accountability. In
addition, the state needs to consider the effect its selection method will have
on the diversity of the judiciary, along with the effect the selection method
will have on the public's confidence in the judiciary. Finally, states need to
consider their regulation of the judiciary as a supplement to initial selection
methods to ensure the independence and integrity of the judiciary is
preserved after selection.
No matter the selection system, all judicial candidates and their activities are governed by many different sets of regulations. First, judicial
candidates are governed by the general election laws of the state. These
laws regulate the due dates for declaring candidacy, the procedure for
nominating candidates, and the procedures for voting, in addition to many
other important details. 150 Judicial candidates are also subject to the general
campaign finance laws of each state. These laws usually require disclosure
of the financial sources of a candidate's election fund. 15 1 Since nearly all
judicial candidates are lawyers, candidates are also subject to the lawyer's
ethical codes of each respective state, which are usually based on the
145.

146.

147.

148.

149.
150.
151.

WARRICK, supra note 93 (see "Connecticut" in Part III).
Id.
WARRICK, supra note 93 (see "New Mexico" in Part III).
Id.

Id.

McFADDEN, supra note 61, at 16.

Id. at43.
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ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 152 Finally, it is
important to remember that states are also subject to the Voting Rights
Act. 153 Specifically, those states covered by §4 need pre-clearance review
for any change in their voting procedure. 154 States subject to §4 also need
155
to pre-approve any changes from electing judges to appointing judges.
Additionally, in order for judicial elections to comply with the Voting
Rights Act, minority voters must have an equal opportunity
of participating
56
in the process to elect the candidates of their choice.'
Despite all these sources of regulation, the largest source of regulation
comes from codes of conduct specifically written to regulate the conduct of
judges. The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides the foundation
for the various state codes of judicial conduct. Originally promulgated in
1924, the Code has undergone several revisions with the current edition
enacted in 2004.157 Throughout all the editions, the framers of the ABA
stress the importance of judicial58 impartiality and independence, including
the appearance of impartiality. 1
Two important clauses in the Model Code additionally restrict a judicial candidate's ability to speak on important election issues in order to
preserve this appearance of independence, however, one of the clauses was
recently overturned by Republican Party of Minnesota v. White. 159 One
clause is the "announce clause," which prohibits judicial candidates from
announcing how they will rule on an issue. 160 Another clause restricting the
speech of judicial candidates is the "Pledges and Promises Clause," which
prohibits candidates from making pledges or promises to rule in a specific
way once in office. 161 Together the clauses were promulgated with the goal
of preventing judicial candidates from making statements that undermine
the actual independence
of the bench or even the appearance of the bench's
162
independence.

152.
Id. at 15.
153.
Ifill, supra note 7, at 57-58.
154.
Id.
155.
Id. at 58.
156.
Id. at 85.
157.
Conser, supra note 103, at 274.
158.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucT Canon 2 (2004). Canon 2 of the current
Model Code of Judicial Conduct is titled: "A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the
Appearance of Impropriety in all of the Judge's Activities." Id. This reflects the Supreme
Court rulings "that even the appearance of bias may violate the due process rights of
litigants." Ifill, supra note 7, at 61.
159. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
160.
White, 536 U.S. at 770.
161.
Ifill, supra note 7, at 60.
162.
Id. at 60-61.
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The announce clause was subjected to strict scrutiny by the Supreme
Court as a violation of a judicial candidate's right to free speech. 163 The
text of the announce clause at issue provided: "a candidate for judicial
office shall not 'announce his or her views on disputed legal or political
issues.' "64 The State of Minnesota provided the Court with two compelling interests in order to justify its announce clause, preservation of the
impartiality of the judiciary and preservation of the appearance of the
impartiality of the judiciary.165 Justice Scalia began his opinion by
supplying several definitions of impartiality because while Minnesota
asserted impartiality as their interest, neither the Minnesota Code nor the
ABA Model Code supplied a definition of impartiality.1 66 Justice Scalia
then analyzed whether the announce clause was narrowly tailored to any of
these definitions.
The first definition that Justice Scalia analyzed for impartiality was a
lack of bias for or against either party. 167 The Court then held that the
announce clause was not narrowly tailored to meet this definition of
impartiality because the announce clause did not restrict speech as 168
to
issues.
specific
regarding
only
speech
prohibited
but
parties,
particular
The second definition the Court proposed for impartiality was lack of bias
toward a particular legal issue. 169 The Court held that a judge's lack of a
predisposition toward a particular legal issue is not a prerequisite for equal
justice since it is nearly impossible to find a judge who does not have
preconceptions about the law.170 Justice Scalia went on to say that even if
you could find judges who did not have preconceived notions about the
law, it would not be desirable to do so because lack of bias about the law
shows "lack of qualification, not lack of bias."' 17' The third definition of
impartiality that the court supplied was general "open-mindedness."'' 72 This
type of impartiality requires that judges be open to ideas that contradict
their own views about the law. 7 3 The Court did not believe Minnesota
adopted the clause for this reason; but held that the clause was so underinclusive that it could not be narrowly tailored regardless of the interest
163.
164.
(2002)).
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

White, 536 U.S. at 774-75.
Id. at 770 (quoting Minn. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)
Id. at 775.
Id.
Id.
White, 536 U.S at 776.
Id. at 777.
Id.
Id. at 778.
Id.
White, 536 U.S. at 778.
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asserted. 74 Judges would be able to offer their opinions in speeches, books,
and lectures up until the time they declared their candidacy for a judicial
75
position, but would not be able to speak their mind during a campaign.1
After their candidacy, they would again be able to speak about their biases
76
toward particular legal issues, up until the moment of pending litigation.
Because all three definitions failed to provide a compelling interest to
clause was narrowly tailored, the clause was held to be
which the announce
77
1
unconstitutional.
Many critics have opposed the Court's decision in White for being
"overly simplistic. ,1 78 The Court's definitions of impartiality, which
distinguish impartiality as lack of bias toward parties, or alternatively, lack
of bias toward legal issues, fail to recognize that bias toward a legal issue is
bias toward a party. 179 The White Court's analysis is entirely dependent on
the way in which one defines the party: the party may be "Jane Doe, but
Jane Doe may also be an immigrant, a welfare recipient, an environmentalist, an anti-abortion campaigner, a union organizer, a mother suing for
custody, or a doctor sued for malpractice.' 180 Therefore, biases toward a
particular legal issue can be, and are in many instances, biases for or against
parties and biases against legal issues are
a particular party. Biases against
181
coin."'
same
the
of
sides
"two
In the aftermath of the Court's ruling in White, many state and district
courts expanded on the ruling of White and overturned provisions of their
codes of judicial conduct as being facially unconstitutional. One example is
the Weaver v. Bonner' 82 Court, which struck down a provision of the
Georgia judicial conduct code that prohibited candidates from making
"false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive" statements.' 83 The 1 1' Circuit
read the White opinion to suggest that the same standards apply for judicial
elections as those that apply for legislative and executive elections. 184 In
addition to the cases that overturned provisions of judicial conduct codes,
the ABA modified its Model Code of Judicial Conduct in August of
2003.185 The ABA followed right in line with Justice Scalia's opinion and
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

183.

Id. at 780.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 788.
Raban, supra note 29, at 212.
id. at 212.
Id.
Id.
309 F.3d 1312 (1lth Cir. 2002).

GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon

7(B)(1)(d) (1994).

Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1321.
184.
Joe Cutler, Oops! I Said it Again: Judicial Codes of Conduct, the First
185.
Amendment, and the Definition of Impartiality, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 733, 741 (2004).
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added a8 6definition of impartiality that was lifted directly from the opinion in
White.1
From the White decision and its aftermath, one can easily see that judicial elections are becoming more and more like those of the executive and
legislative branches. Even when judicial elections were differentiated with
the announce clause in place, it did not cure the fundamental problem with
judicial elections. When judges rule in accordance with the public opinion
by which they achieved office they violate every litigant's right to
impartiality. 187 Now that courts have held as unconstitutional provisions
which restrict a candidate's speech, judicial elections are threatening the
impartiality of the bench more than ever, for elected judges always have the
"sword of popular opinion hanging over their necks whether or not they can
188
make controversial public announcements during their campaigns."'
Although clauses restricting the speech of judicial candidates have
been invalidated, provisions in the codes of judicial conduct still prohibit
many different types of political conduct by a judicial candidate. The
majority of these provisions are contained in Canon 5, which is named, "A
Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain From Inappropriate Political
Activity."' 89 While the Code does allow a judicial candidate to purchase
tickets to political gatherings, identify with a political party, speak on his
own behalf, appear in the media, distribute campaign materials, and endorse
or oppose other candidates, Canon 5 also places significant restrictions on a
judicial candidate's political conduct.' 90
One important restriction, located in Canon 5(C)(2), prohibits a judicial candidate from personally soliciting or accepting any campaign
donations.' 91 The candidate must establish a committee through which all
campaign funds are channeled. 192 This provision is designed to protect the
independence and impartiality of the bench by insulating it from campaign

186.
Id. In the "terminology" section of the ABA Code, it defines impartiality as the
"absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as
well as maintaining an open mind in considering issues that may come before the judge."
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004) at 8. Additionally, it should be noted that the
"pledges and promises" clause is still contained in the ABA Code: a candidate for judicial
office "shall not with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before
the court, make pledges, promises or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial
performance of the adjudicative duties of the office." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2004).
187.
Raban, supra note 29, at 211.
188.
Id. at 211-12.
189.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (2004).
190.
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(1) (2004).
191.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(2) (2004).
192.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(2) (2004).
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funds that could potentially affect a judge's decision. 193 Previously, the
ABA Code prohibited the judicial candidate from knowing who contributed
to the campaign fund, however, with recent campaign finance laws,
disclosure requirements apply to all election candidates.194 The ABA Code
gave way to this trend in the most recent edition, which requires a
a report stating all the contributors to the
candidate's committee to file
195
fund.
campaign
candidate's
In addition to the prohibition on personal solicitation of funds, the
ABA code requires that campaign contributions be "reasonable."'' 96 The
model code is written to allow states to place their own contribution limits
for both aggregate donations and individual donations. 197 States have not
universally accepted this provision; about half of states limit individual
contributions. 198 Finally, the Model Code prohibits both judges and judicial
candidates from holding office in a political organization, making speeches
on behalf of a political organization, attending political gatherings, or
contributing to a political organization. 199
The Code of Judicial Conduct also specifically addresses those candidates seeking office through appointment. These candidates seeking
appointment for a judicial position or other government office may not
accept any funds, through a committee or otherwise, to support his or her
candidacy. 2°° There are also prohibitions on political activity by a candidate, except for: (1) communicating with a nominating commission; (2)
seeking recommendations from organizations; and (3) providing information about his or her qualifications to the parties in the first two exceptions. 20 1 There are fewer restrictions on non-judge candidates as they may
hold office in a political organization, attend political gatherings, and
continue their dues to a political organization.20 2 The Code thoroughly
tries to insulate the judiciary from improper influences in order to preserve

193.

McFADDEN, supra note 61, at 32.

195.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(4) (2004).

194.

Id.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(2) (2004).
196.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(3) (2004).
197.
McFADDEN, supra note 61, at 29. In Buckley v. Valeo the Supreme Court
198.
considered the Federal Election Campaign Act which placed limits on both contributions to
a campaign and limits on total campaign expenditures. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The court held
that expenditure limits are a violation of the right to free speech, but upheld the contribution
limits imposed by the Act. Id. at 143. The Court also upheld expenditure limits as a
condition of receiving public funding. Id.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1) (2004).
199.
200.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(1) (2004).
201.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(2)(a) (2004).
202.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(2)(b) (2004).
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the appearance of impartiality, no matter what judicial selection method is
employed.
1I11.

THREATS TO JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY AND THEIR SOLUTIONS

Many problems arise from the election of judges; the vast majority of
these problems can be grouped into three categories: voter apathy,
campaign finance, and improper influences on a judge's conduct. Voter
apathy is one major problem with judicial elections because voters as a
whole have not been provided with information regarding the judicial
system or with specific information about the candidates.2 °3 Voter
knowledge, however, is exactly what makes elections work-voters choose
the most qualified candidate to serve on the bench. 2° Without an informed
electorate, voters will not be able to choose the most qualified candidates
and the entire justification for electing judges will be eliminated. 0 5
With a lack of voter knowledge, success in a judicial election may
depend more on appealing to the electorate and less on the true qualifications of a good judge. 2°6 If the electorate does not have adequate information regarding the candidates, it will be much more susceptible to "catchy
but misleading slogans" and "improperly financed campaign[s]. 2 °7
Because of this, "judges have no choice but to campaign" knowing that
their best chance of getting elected rests not on their qualifications, but with
their popular appeal.20 8 Judicial candidates therefore engage in expensive
advertising campaigns in order to best capture the interests of the populace.
These campaigns become virtual "arms races" with no "strategic arms
limitations.2°
Voter apathy is prevalent in contested elections as well as retention
elections. Retention elections are consistently characterized by lower voter
turnouts. 2 ° Without any choice on the ballot, voters scrutinize the
candidates less and are even less informed about their choice.211 While
contested elections are likely to generate at least some debate about the
better of the two candidates, in retention elections a lack of any competition
203.
MCFADDEN, supra note 61, at xiv. Some commentators argue that "voters are
no less informed in judicial races than they are in legislative or executive election races."
Olszewski, supra note 18, at 11.
204.
Czarnezki, supra note 98, at 179.
205.

206.

Id.

CARBON & BERKSON, supra note 101, at 14.

207.
MCFADDEN, supra note 61, at xiv.
208.
Joanna Cohn Weiss, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State Judiciary
Violate CriminalDefendants' Due ProcessRights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1101, 1117 (2006).

209.
210.
211.

Carrington, supra note 62, at 268.
CARBON & BERKSON, supra note 101, at 15.
Id.
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stifles interest in the judge's qualifications. 212 An uninformed electorate
plagues both retention elections and contested elections, whether partisan or
otherwise.
The solution to this problem requires not only education about the
candidates themselves, but also education about the nature of the judiciary.
It is important that the concept of judicial independence and its importance
be impressed upon the electorate to ensure an understanding of the
desirable characteristics in a candidate. a 3 Only after this foundation has
been laid can information regarding candidates be useful to the voter. The
question arises: on whom should the responsibility fall to educate the
populace? 2 14 Some answer that it should be "the bar, the bench, and
judicial activists. '2 15
Once the electorate understands the necessity of judicial independence,
information about a candidate's qualifications can be useful to the voter. 216
One state has attempted to achieve a more informed electorate. Texas
passed a bill in 2001 that required "judicial candidates to file biographical
2 17
information regarding their educational and professional experience.',
The state then made the information available on a website for forty-five
days before the election. 1 8 Texas' attempt to educate its electorate about
candidates' qualifications will help ensure that candidates are chosen based
on the qualifications necessary to an independent and impartial judiciary.
The old Model Cannons of Judicial Ethics contained Canon 32: "Gifts
and Favors. 2 1 9 This canon provided: "A judge should not accept any
presents or favors from litigants, or from lawyers practicing before him or
from others whose interests are likely to be submitted to him for judgment., 220 With the intensification of judicial elections, however, that rule is
far removed from the current situation of plentiful campaign contributions.

41.

212.
213.

Id.
Abrahamson, JudicialIndependence as a Campaign Platform, supra note 36, at

214.
Ifill, supra note 7, at 98.
215.
Id.
216.
Some argue that wide dissemination of a candidate's qualifications is not
necessary for retention elections. If the judge's "record is egregious enough to warrant
removal" there will be "sufficient adverse publicity . . . generated" to oppose the judge
without the need of an opponent. CARBON & BERKSON, supra note 101, at 15. This adverse
publicity is exactly the problematic campaigning that leaves the voters uninformed because
it can captivate the public by construing a judge's holdings inaccurately and withholding
information about both sides of the issue.
217.
Kotey, supra note 11, at 605-06.
218.
Id. at 606.
219.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL
ETmics wrm THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs ANNOTATED AND CANONS OF JUDICIAL
ETHICS ANNOTATED 198-229 (1967).
220.
Id. at 225.
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As discussed previously, due to a lack of voter knowledge, large campaigns
are especially important in judicial races. "In the 2004 judicial election
cycle, $24.4 million was spent on television advertisements, over twice as
much as the $10.6 million spent in the 2000 election cycle. 22 1 Considering
the fact that, on average, winners of judicial elections outspend their
losers,222 campaign contributions become more and more important to a
judicial candidate.
The recent increase in the cost of judicial campaigns, along with the
sources of funds for those campaigns, has not gone unnoticed by the public.
In a nation-wide survey of judicial and public opinion, the question was
asked: "How much influence do you think campaign contributions made to
judges have on their decisions? '223 Seventy-six percent (76%) of the public
said that they felt campaign contributions have "some influence" or "a great
deal of influence" on the decisions of judges. 224 Twenty-six percent (26%)
percent of judges responded that they felt that campaign contributions had
"some influence" or "a great deal of influence" on their decisions. 5 This
national study reflects what individual states have also found: in Ohio only
seven percent (7%) of people think judges' decisions are never influenced
by campaign contributions while fifty-eight percent (58%) percent said
judges' decisions are sometimes influenced and twenty-three percent (23%)
felt that judges' decisions are influenced most of the time. 26 In Texas, a
1999 study conducted by the Texas Supreme Court found that ninety-nine
percent (99%) of attorneys and eighty-six percent (86%) of judges felt
campaign contributions have some influence on judicial decisions.
It is clear from these studies and surveys that campaign contributions
are not only affecting the appearance of the impartiality of the judiciary, but
those within the judiciary itself believe the independence of the judiciary
has been compromised. These results show that both the public and the
judiciary believe those with money can buy justice.227 A continuation of
these policies will erode the public faith in the judiciary, the very confidence that is necessary for the functioning of the judiciary.2 28
221.
Shepard, Electing Judges, supra note 85, at 23.
222.
MCFADDEN, supra note 61, at 26. A 2002 study of state Supreme Court justices
found that in most races, the candidate who aired the most television advertisements won the
election. Ifill, supra note 7, at 65. Another study conducted by the "California Commission
on Campaign Financing found that winners of open judicial seats outspent losers four to one:
$128,000 to $32,000." Chemerinsky, supranote 4, at 137.
223.
Kotey, supra note 11, at 608.
224.
Id. at 608-09.
225.
Id. at 609.
226.
Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 138.
227.
Carrington, supra note 62, at 267.
228.
Id.
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Several solutions have been proposed to deal with the problem of
campaign contributions. One solution that the ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct adopted previously was the use of a campaign finance committee
through which all donations had to be filtered.229 Judges were not allowed
to personally solicit or accept donations from people.23 ° On the other hand,
recent campaign finance laws, which are directed at other governmental
elections, but which apply equally to judicial elections, require disclosure of
all campaign funds and their sources. 231 Every single state has adopted
these disclosure laws, which require reporting of all contributors to a
judicial candidate's campaign.232 These new disclosure laws prevent
insulating judicial candidates from the identity of their donors.233 With
knowledge of the identity of their donors, the risk of a judge altering his or
her decisions in accordance with the donors' interests rises greatly.234
One solution has been proposed: because of the nature of judicial elections and their differences from legislative and executive elections, all
donations to a judicial campaign must remain anonymous. This would
"discourage quid pro quo corruption" because candidates would never learn
the identity of their donors.2 35 This solution will never take root, however,
as long as the trend of treating judicial elections the same as legislative and
executive elections continues.
Other solutions proposed to eliminate the improper influences resulting from campaign contributions are limits on both expenditures by a
candidate and contributions to a candidate's fund. Currently, many states
limit how much an individual can contribute to a judge's campaign fund;
however, only Texas limits contributions in the aggregate from any single
law firm.236 Since 1995, Texas has placed a $30,000 limit on the amount
one law firm can contribute to a judge's campaign. 37 This is a first step
toward minimizing the influence that one law firm can have on a judge's
decisions because in the aggregate, one law firm has the ability to raise
large amounts of money that dwarf other individual contributions.

229.
230.
231.

See MCFADDEN, supra note 61, at 30-3 1.

Id.
Gerald F. Uelmen, Disqualification of Judges for Campaign Support or

Opposition, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETICS 419,422-23 (1990).

232.
Id.
233.
Id. at 423.
234.
Id.
235.
Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: MandatingDonorAnonymity
to Disrupt the Marketfor PoliticalInfluence, 50 STAN. L.REv. 837, 837 (1998).
236.
Roy Schotland, Proposed Legislation on Judicial Election Campaign Finance,
64 Omo ST. L.J. 127, 127 (2003).
237.
Id. at 128.
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Any such contribution and expenditure limits are subject to Buckley v.
Valeo.2 38 The Supreme Court in Buckley considered the constitutionality of
the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which
limited campaign contributions, and expenditures, required disclosure of
donations, and provided some public funding for presidential campaigns.239
The Supreme Court upheld the limits on contributions, but found that
expenditure limits violated the First Amendment. 240 Expenditure limits
violated the First Amendment as they "restrict[ed] the nature and quantity
of speech," but this "direct effect" was not found with contribution limits.24 '
Some argue that Buckley is distinguishable because it analyzed expenditure
limits within the context of all elections, whereas the interest for limiting
expenditures in judicial elections is much more compelling due to the
nature of the judiciary.242 Thus far it has been applied equally to judicial
elections as it has been applied to other elections.
Another solution to eliminate the impropriety associated with campaign contributions is to require a judge's recusal anytime a donor appears
before the judge. In nearly every state, a judge can be disqualified from a
case if bias is shown.243 The current Model Code of Judicial Conduct
requires that:
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;...
(e) the judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party or a party's lawyer has within the previous [ I year[s] made aggregate contributions to the
judge's campaign in an amount that is greater than
[[[$
] for an individual or [$
] for an entity] ]]
[[is reasonable
and
appropriate
for
an
individual or an
244
entity.]]

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 139-40.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 135.
Banner, supra note 1333, at 483.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (2004).
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These canons supplement federal statutes that also require recusal whenever
a judge's impartiality might "reasonably be questioned." Three U.S. Code
provisions in title 28 address recusal: § 144 prohibits judges from hearing a
case when a valid affidavit has been submitting showing actual bias; §47
prevents a judge from hearing the appeal of a case when they oversaw the
case at the lower level; §455 prohibits a judge who is actually or appears to
be biased from hearing a case.245 The most used section for recusal is §455,
which was expressly designed to preserve public confidence in the
judiciary. 246
to
Courts have interpreted both Canon 3(E) and the federal statutes 247
require recusal when actual bias or the appearance of bias is present.
Unfortunately, courts have been hesitant to enforce these statutes. Motions
for disqualification are routinely denied where a party to the proceedings
has made a contribution to the sitting judge's campaign fund. 248 This could
be due to the fact that recusal cannot be applied in every situation where a
party has contributed to the judge's campaign. Recusal would discourage
valid contributions where a person wants to support a judge he or she
believes is qualified. With courts unwilling to force judges to recuse
themselves from cases, recusal will not be an effective solution for
minimizing the effects of campaign contributions on the independence of
the judiciary.
One final solution to the problems associated with campaign financing
is public funding of elections. The ABA has recommended that states
finance their judicial elections to preserve the appearance of an impartial
judiciary. 249 With public funding, judges would not be indebted to one
specific financier. Instead, they would only be indebted to serve the
public's interest. The availability of public money also has the added
benefit of producing more qualified candidates because public funding

See Jay Hall, The Road Less Traveled: The Third Circuit's Preservation of
245.
JudicialImpartialityin an Imperfect World, 50 VILL. L. REv. 1265, 1267 (2005).
246.
Id. at 1274.
247.
Michelle L. Bullard, Ethics - Collier v. Griffith - Determining Whether
Tennessee State Court Judges Should Recuse Themselves From Cases Which Involve
Attorneys in LeadershipPositions in Their Campaignsfor Re-Election, 23 MEM. ST. U. L.
REv. 741, 743 (1992-93).
248.
Uelmen, supra note 232, at 423. For cases dealing with recusal and campaign
contributions, see Keane v. Andrews, 555 So. 2d 940 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
campaign contribution was not sufficient grounds for recusal); Anguilar v. Anderson, 855
S.W.2d 799 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that judge did not abuse discretion in refusing to
recuse himself where he solicited and accepted campaign contributions from defendants);
Massongill v. County of Scott, 991 S.W.2d 105 (Ark. 1999) (holding that trial judge did not
have to recuse himself when one of the attorney's served as his campaign treasurer).
Kotey, supra note 11, at 615.
249.
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makes running for judicial office more attractive.250 The voters then have
more choices and can elect the best man or woman for the job.
The same problems plague all public funding programs, and at the top
of that list is securing adequate funding. The experience of virtually all
states shows that tax add-ons are ineffective. 251 Another source for the
public funding of judicial elections would be the users of the court system
itself. 252 This could be achieved through increased lawyer licensing fees,
increased filing fees, or a surcharge on criminal fines or civil penalties.253
Even with these changes, public funding programs will be chronically
under funded, leading judicial candidates to seek funding elsewhere,
especially from those that appear before their bench. At this time, the
problem of campaign contributions can only be eliminated by moving to a
non-elective system of selecting judges which eliminates the need for
campaign contributions altogether.
The last major category of problems associated with the election of
judges occurs when judges change their behavior based on public opinion.
These behavioral changes are not based on legitimate influences of a
judge's ruling such as the law, facts, or evidence, but instead are based on
opinion polls and the threat of removal at the election. 4 This violates not
only the judicial duty of faithful application of the law, but also promotes
and encourages judicial legislation.255 The legal system of the United
States is based on consistent rulings by the judiciary. If judges change their
holdings at every election to remain popular, the election of judges
undermines the entire judicial system.256
The change in judicial behavior, especially as election time nears, is
most obvious in the context of criminal justice. A 2004 study conducted by
Gregory Huber and Sanford Gordon found that judges increase the
257
sentences they impose on criminal defendants as the next election nears.
The researchers concluded that over 2,700 extra years of incarceration
could be attributed to increases in sentences due to an upcoming election. 258
In another analysis of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, a study concluded that
the justices were less likely to protect prisoner and defendant rights as the
next election nears. 259 Additionally, it has been found that as election time
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Geyh, supra note 8, at 1480.
Id. at 1478.
Id. at 1478-79.
Id.
Raban, supra note 29, at 214.
Id.
See Czarnezki, supra note 98, at 175.
Weiss, supra note 2088, at 1109-10.
Id. at 1110.
Czarnezki, supra note 98, at 174.
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nears, it is more likely that a criminal defendant will get the death sentence
as opposed to a life sentence.26 It is clear just from the criminal justice
context that judges who are subjected to regular elections will be more
likely to submit to public opinion as opposed to applying the law impartially 6 1
The easiest solution to problematic judicial behavior is to elect judges
for life tenure. Life tenure, or even more lengthy terms, would ensure that
judges do not need to fear an upcoming election and can therefore make
decisions that may be unpopular, but are in accordance with the law. Since
the competence of a judge increases with experience, an additional benefit
to electing judges for longer terms or life tenure would be a more qualified
bench. 62 Moreover, life tenure is the position that is expressly endorsed by
Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist No. 78 as the best means with which
to insure judicial independence.2 63
If life tenure is not accepted by the states due to calls for accountability of the judiciary, 264 the terms of judges could at least be doubled or
tripled in length. This would not only allow judges to rule in accordance
with the law without fear of public retribution, but the need to constantly
finance a campaign would also decrease.26 5 Life tenure or longer terms of
service, subject to good behavior, could present a compromise between the
independence of the judiciary and the accountability of judges to the public.
Until states provide this, however, judges will be tempted to rule in
accordance with popular opinion as elections approach.

IV.

GLOBAL SELECTION METHODS

Before analyzing foreign selection methods for judges, it is important
to ask whether we should even look to foreign countries' selection methods
because of the current controversy surrounding the use of international law
260. Id. at 173.
261.
For further studies that discuss changes in judicial behavior as a correlation with
elections, see Souders, supra note 36, at 540-42.
262.
263.

CARBON & BERKSON, supra note 101, at 17.
THm FEDERALIST No. 78, at 103 (Alexander Hamilton)

(Tudor Publishing 1937):
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a
limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial
offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.
264.
Accountability can be preserved through a removal process because life tenure
judges usually serve subject to a "good behavior" provision, similar to the Federal
Constitution.
265.
Carrington, supra note 62, at 274.
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in United States courts.266 Despite the current controversy, the early U.S.

courts frequently looked to international law to fill in the "gaps" in
domestic law.267 The early courts had no choice but to look to transnational
law because this country had no "Code Civil," a complete supply of law
that the Civil Law countries possessed, and no jurisprudence to turn to as a
common law country. The courts have incorporated international law into
their own jurisprudence via the principle of comity, the "judicial deference
to foreign courts and law in the name of harmonious foreign relations. 268
In contrast to early courts, modern United States courts have developed a new skepticism toward foreign law.269 Justice Scalia27 ° sums up this
position in his Lawrence v. Texas dissent, which severely criticized Justice
Kennedy's use of international law in the majority opinion as "meaningless
dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since this 'Court... should not impose
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.' ,,271 The reality, however,
is that every member of the current Supreme Court who has sat a full term
has either authored or joined opinions that have used foreign and international law to interpret constitutional provisions that facially have no
international implications.27 2 In two recent high-profile cases, the Court
specifically used international law when it was unnecessary. In both
Lawrence v. Texas 27 3 and Grutter v. Bollinger,274 the Court looked to

international law for support, in a superfluous and discretionary manner,
demonstrating the Court's commitment to 275
the globalization trend which
"does not end at the Supreme Court's steps."

266.
Noga Morag-Levine, Judges, Legislators, and Europe's Law: Common-Law
Constitutionalismand ForeignPrecedents,65 MD. L. REv. 32, 38 (2006).
267.
Janet Koven Levit, Going Public with Transnational Law: The 2002-2003
Supreme Court Term, 39 TULSA L. REv. 155, 157 (2003). In fact, the issue was addressed
before the country was even formed in the Federalist No. 63 which claimed the "importance
of attention to the judgment of other nations." THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 1 (Alexander
Hamilton or James Madison) (Tudor Publishing 1937).
268.
Levit, supra note 267, at 157-58.
269.
See generally id. at n. 44 (listing examples of cases where Supreme Court
justices specifically endorse or admonish the use of international law).
270.
Justice Scalia himself used Australian, Canadian, and English law in McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 381-82 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
271.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002)). Within months after the Lawrence decision, a series
of proposals against the citation of foreign precedents came before the House of Representatives. Morag-Levine, supra note 266, at 38. Representatives Tom Feeney and Bob
Goodlatte introduced another resolution titled "The Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution." Id. at 38-39.
272.
Mark Wendell DeLaquil, Foreign Law and Opinion in State Courts, 69 ALB. L.
REv. 697, 697 (2006).
273.
539 U.S. 558 (2003)
274.
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
275.
Levit, supra note 267, at 162.
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The global emergence of powerful, independent courts has increased
the use of "legal transplantation. ,,276 This trend does not have to end with
the laws of our country. Rather, it can spread to other important aspects of
our legal system, including the way we select our judges. With the growing
feeling of community between members of the judiciary worldwide, 277 it
makes sense to look to foreign selection methods in order to continually
improve our own selection of judges. As nations develop and reform their
court systems, they also strive to balance independence and accountability.
We can learn from their experiences as we strive to find the perfect balance
between independence and accountability.
The election of justices has universally been rejected as most countries
choose to appoint their judges in some form or another. The recent trend
has been to add a judicial appointments commission to screen and
recommend candidates to the executive, but which have no binding power
on the executive's choice.278 Many civil law countries have held onto their
traditional career judiciaries composed of faithful civil servants. 279
Candidates enter the judicial ranks through either a school program or an
examination.28 ° Upon successful completion of school or the exam, the
candidate usually completes an apprenticeship, after which he or she is
appointed to a judicial position.28 ' Many states continue to use these two
popular methods of selecting judges, and countries trying to establish an
independent judiciary often look to these two models.28 2

276.
Morag-Levin, supra note 266, at 32.
277.
Id.
278.
See generally APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER (Kate
Malleson & Peter H. Russel eds., 2006) [hereinafter APPOINTING JUDGES].
279.
See generally Table 2 at p. 479; APPOINTING JUDGES, supra note 278.
280.
See discussion infra at pp. 484-85.
281.
See discussion infra at pp. 484-85.
282.
See generally APPOINTING JUDGES, supra note 278.
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TABLE 2: SELECTIONS METHODS FOR FOREIGN JUDICIARIES

283

Executive Appointment
Without
Commission

With
Commission

Appointment by
Commission

Legislative
Appointment

Career
Judiciary

Afghanistan

Albania

Algeria

China

Czech
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Republic

Argentina

Canada

Andorra
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France

Australia

Dominican

Angola

Laos

Germany

Bangladesh

England

Bulgaria

Macedonia

Italy

Belarus

Hong Kong

Caribbean
Court of Justice

Montenegro

Japan

Belgium

Greece

Croatia

Poland

Cambodia

Namibia

Cyprus

Portugal

Chad

Russia

Israel

Spain

Egypt

Scotland

Lebanon

Turkey

New
Zealand

South
Africa

Uzbekistan

Ukraine

Rwanda

Zimbabwe

Yemen

Republic

_______________

283.

This chart is based in large part on APPOINTING JUDGES, supra note 278 and
supra note 35, along with the
information contained in Appendix Two at pp. 494-518. Categorizing countries according to
selection method is inherently problematic because countries often use multiple selection
methods for different levels of judges. Accordingly, countries were categorized according to
the primary selection method used for judges. While all countries could not be included,
information on counties not included in this table is included in Appendix Two.
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In many countries the executive still retains the power to appoint
judges.2 8
Some countries, however, have supplemented executive
appointment with a recommending committee to ensure that those
appointed are qualified and to diffuse some of the power away from the
executive.28 5 One country that still retains the power to appoint exclusively
with the executive is Australia.286 Australia is a federal state, with court
systems at both the federal and state levels. 287 In Australia, the power to
appoint federal judges in vested solely in the Governor-General.288 The
Governor-General in Council is the "executive government of the day. 289
Additionally, in all Australian states, the executive branch makes appointments to the judiciary.290
This method of selection seems like it would insulate the judiciary and
protect its independence. Judges, however, have been susceptible to
removal through the restructuring of courts even though their life tenure is
codified in the constitution. 29 1 Additionally, the high courts in Australia
have been hearing more and more sensitive, political issues that were
usually left to the other branches of government, resulting in the judiciary
becoming more "politicized. 2 92 With these changes, the citizens of
Australia have been calling for changes to the process of appointment that
allows for more consultation by the executive and more security for the
judges themselves. 9 3
Proposals for diffusing the power to appoint from the executive have
been presented recently in Australia, including a commission that would
make recommendations to the executive branch.294 Justices that have been
appointed have usually been male and former leaders of the Bar, so it is
thought that a commission would also help increase the diversity of the
295
bench.
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INDEPENDENCE INTHE AGE OFDEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 173, 175.
287.
Id. at 174.
288.
AusTL. CONST., §72 states: "The Justices of the High Court and of the other
courts created by the Parliament (i.) shall be appointed by the Governor-General in Council.
289.
Williams, supra note 286, at 175.
290.
Id.
291.
Id. at 182-83.
292.
Elizabeth Handsley, "The Judicial Whisper Goes Around:" Appointment of
JudicialOfficers in Australia, in APPOINTING JUDGES, supra note 278, at 122, 124-25.
293.
Id. at 124.
294.
Williams, supra note 286, at 186.
295.
Id.
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executive government. As the high courts continue to vindicate individual
rights, they will remain under the scrutiny of the public eye, however, and
calls will continue for a more representative, accountable judiciary.
The reforms that were called for in Australia have indeed been implemented in countries across the world. In fact, the use of a nominating
judicial commission is one of the most popular selection methods used by
the countries surveyed.296 South Africa employs this selection method in
order to effectively handle many of the highly charged issues that surround
their judiciary. The biggest issue the judiciary must deal with is the racial
and gender composition of the judiciary. In a country marked by apartheid
and segregation, the legitimacy of the judiciary is especially dependent on
its racial composition.2 97 In fact, the Constitution requires that diversity be
taken in account when any appointments are made to the bench. 298
In order to achieve diversity in the bench, South Africa instituted the
Judicial Service Commission (JSC). 2 99 The President appoints judges with
the advice of the JSC, but it is the practice of the JSC to only present the
President with one nominee, thereby effectively choosing the judicial
candidates themselves.3 0
The JSC is constitutionally prescribed and
composed of twenty-three permanent members. 30 1 Three members are
judges themselves, from the highest courts; five members are from the legal
profession and appointed by the President after nomination from the
constituencies; eleven members are politicians: the minister of justice, six
members from the National Assembly, and four members from the other
house of Parliament; finally four members are designated by the President.30 2
The utility of the JSC has proven effective at limiting the discretion of
the executive and increasing the diversity of the bench.30 3 Much of the
success of the JSC can be attributed to the openness of the selection

296.
297.

See Table 2, supra at p. 479.
Francois Du Bois, Judicial Selection in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in
APPOINTING JUDGES, supra note 278, at 280, 281.
298.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 174(2) ("The need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the
racial and gender composition of South Africa must be considered when judicial officers are
appointed.").
299.
Du Bois, supra note 297, at 280.
300.
Hugh Corder, Seeking Social Justice? Judicial Independence and Responsiveness in a Changing South Africa, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY,
supra note 35, at 194, 197. For the Constitutional Court, the JSC must provide the President
with three more names than vacancies on the court, for all other courts, the JSC provides one
name per vacancy. Id.
301.
S.AFR.CONST. 1996 § 178.
302.
Du Bois, supra note 297, at 283-84.
303.
Id. at 285.
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process. 3 4 When there is a vacancy in the judiciary it is widely publicized. 30 5 The names of candidates are posted with an invitation for
comments by the public. 3° Interviews of candidates for the positions are
conducted in public. 30 7 Pre-selection and post-selection discussions are
conducted in private; however, a transcript of those discussions is made
public later.3 °8 The openness of the proceedings has the effect of recruiting
more diverse candidates and thereby increasing the diversity of the bench,
along with the legitimacy of the judiciary in the eyes of the public.
This system of selection provides for both accountability and independence. The Constitution provides that judges serve a non-renewable
term of twelve years. 309 Judges can potentially be removed from office, but
no judge has been removed since 1897,310 so it is clear that judges enjoy
some security in their office, leading to more independence. The accountability of the judiciary comes not only from the removal process, but also
from the composition of the JSC. 3 1 1 If citizens do not like a judge who is
on the bench, they can petition the JSC or the National Assembly for
removal, and then in the future pressure the government for a different
composition of Commission members. In total, this selection system seems
effective in achieving both an independent and accountable judiciary that
has achieved the confidence of the public through its diversity.
While many countries have adopted a judicial commission to make
recommendations to the executive who then appoints the judges, some
countries have gone farther and given the commission the exclusive power
to appoint judges. While the South African JSC effectively decides which
judge gets the appointment, the executive still retains the appointment
power and could use the power in the future and force the JSC to provide
the executive with more nominees. In Israel, however, the multi-branch
judicial commission retains appointment power.
The Israeli judicial system is marked by a lack of constitutional protections.3 12 Despite this, the judiciary has remained largely independent and

304.
Id. at 288.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308.
Du Bois, supra note 297, at 288.
Corder, supra note 300, at 199.
309.
Id. at 200. A judge can only be removed by the President if the JSC first finds
310.
that the judge is incompetent or is guilty of gross misconduct, and if the National Assembly
calls for the removal of the judge by two-thirds of its members. Id.
Du Bois, supra note 297, at 285.
311.
Eli M. Salzberger, JudicialAppointments and Promotions in Israel: Constitu312.
tion, Law and Politics, in APPOINTING JUDGES, supra note 278, at 242.
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has gained the trust and confidence of the public. 3 13 The Court has
achieved this through strict disqualification measures for bias or even the
potential for bias.3 14 The test is not whether the judge was actually
influenced, but whether there is a likelihood that the judge will be
influenced. 31 5 Because of this, the judiciary has established and maintained
316
a reputation for independence, integrity, and intellectual ability.
The 1953 Judges Act established the current procedure for the appointment of judges throughout all the courts in Israel.3 17 The Act
established the Judicial Selection Committee, which is composed of three
judges, two representatives of the bar, two representatives of the executive,
and two representatives of the legislative. 1 8 The minister of justice,
president of the Supreme Court, or any three members of the Committee
can make nominations for the committee's consideration.31 9
It seems that this system for appointing judges would lead to some
institutional independence, however, the legislature has intervened in the
appointment process beyond serving as members of the Judicial Selection
Committee. 32 0 The legislature has passed laws allowing a judge to be
appointed to the high court even though the justice did not meet the legal
qualifications, another law to prevent particular justices from hearing a
case, and a law that changed the retirement age to allow a specific justice to
remain on the court.321
In spite of the legislature interfering in judicial affairs, the Israeli judiciary still retains its reputation of independence, most likely because the
legislature rarely gets involved.
Without constitutional protection,
however, in the future the legislature could utilize their powers to interfere
with the judiciary even more, potentially causing the loss of public
confidence in the judiciary. Despite this shortcoming, Israeli scholars have
unanimously agreed that in the last fifty years the judicial selection
committee has entirely been a success.322
Legislative appointment is rare in foreign countries, especially when
compared with executive appointment. China, however, has retained a
legislative appointment system in order to preserve the power of its citizens.
The Chinese judiciary operates at four levels in China: the Supreme
313.
Shimon Shetreet, The Critical Challenge of Judicial Independence in Israel, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE INTHE AGE OF DEMocRAcY, supra note 35, at 233, 242.
314.
Salzberger, supra note 312, at 239.
315.
Id.
316.
Shetreet, supra note 313, at 255.
317.
Salzberger, supra note 312, at 243.
318.
Shetreet, supra note 313, at 243.
319.
Salzberger, supra note 312, at 249.
320.
Id.
321.
Shetreet, supra note 313, at 243.
322.
Id. at 255.
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People's Courts at the national level, high courts at the provincial level,
intermediate courts at the prefectural level, and basic courts at the provincial level.323 Each level of courts has criminal, civil, economic, and
enforcement divisions.3 24
After the Second World War in China, the Communist Party appointed
judges based on loyalty. In the mid-1990's, however, a large-scale reform
of the judiciary took place in order to establish the "rule of law. 325 The
Judges Law of 1995326 established minimum qualifications for judges to
improve the quality of the judiciary, including the requirement of a law
degree and the successful completion of an exam.327 Once candidates meet
these minimal qualifications, they are appointed by the local People's
Congress at their court level.328 The People's Congress of the same
jurisdictional level also has the power to remove judges.329
Judges within the Chinese judiciary do not experience any independence from the other institutions. There is no tenure of any kind, much less
life tenure, for judges in China.330 Additionally, judges can be removed
rather easily from their positions. Section 11 of the Judge's Law allows
judges to be removed by the People's Congress at the corresponding court
level upon the recommendation of the President of the Court. 3 3 1 As such,
judges do not rule against the Party often or in favor of individual rights.
Not only does the Party exert outside influence on the judiciary, but judges
also feel pressure from the internal ranks of the judiciary and feel the
expectation to rule in a certain way.332 As China seeks to establish a rule of
law society, an important part of that process will be establishing the
independence of the judiciary.
In many civil law countries across the world, judges are chosen from
the ranks of a career judiciary. The career judiciary is usually formed from
civil servants that enter through graduation or the successful completion of
an exam. The majority of the French judiciary is composed of graduates

Graig R. Avino, China's Judiciary:An Instrument of Democratic Change?, 22
323.
PENN. ST. INT'L L. REv. 369, 379 (2003).

324.
325.

Id.
Colin Hawes, Improving the Quality of the Judiciary in China: Recent Reforms

to the Proceduresfor Appointing, Promoting, and Discharging Judges, in APPOINTING
JUDGES, supra note 278, at 395, 399.

The full text of this law can be found at
326.
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2692 (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
327.
Hawes, supra note 325, at 400.
Id. at 401.
328.
329.
Avino, supra note 323, at 379.
330.
Hawes, supra note 325, at 404.
331.
Id. at 403.
332.
Id. at 409.
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from Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature(ENM), located in Bordeaux.33 3
The school was officially established in 1970, but was in existence since
1958. Students enter the ENM after successful graduation with a law
degree from an undergraduate institution and the passage of the entrance
examination.33 4 Persons with
five years of experience in a legal field are
33 5
also eligible to enter ENM.

Once admitted into EMN, a person becomes a civil servant and is paid
a salary by the government. 336 The program at ENM lasts approximately
thirty-one months. During this time, students take courses, but they spend
the majority of their time training on the job.337 Students train through
various legal internships, including prosecutorial and judicial internships,
along with civil and criminal internships.3 38 At the completion of the
program, students take another examination. Those with the highest scores
pick first from a list of vacancies provided by the ministry of justice.3 39
The French judiciary enjoys great institutional independence from
other branches as a career judiciary. Because the judiciary itself has control
over the education and appointment of judges, the executive and legislative
branches cannot influence judges.
Internally, however, judges can
experience great pressure to rule in certain ways because all professional
socialization occurs exclusively within the judiciary. 34° Upon entering the
judiciary, judges are promoted based on merit, which is determined
exclusively by upper level judges. 34 With these internal controls, it is easy
for upper-level judges to influence those below them. Judges in France,
while insulated from other government branches and the public, can still be
subject to improper influences.
Regional and international courts have increased greatly in recent
years as countries across the world recognize the rule of law. 3 2 With the
plethora of international courts, it is also important to consider the methods
they use to select their judges. In fact, there are now over thirty international courts with over two hundred and fifty judges that can exercise
333.

Carlo Guarnieri, JudicialIndependence in Latin Countries of Western Europe,

in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 111, 116.

334.
Doris Marie Provine & Antoine Garapon, The Selection of Judges in France:
Searchingfor a New Legitimacy, in APPOINTING JUDGES, supra note 278, at 176, 183.
335.
Id. at 183.
336.
Id.
337.
Id.

338.
339.

Id.
Id.

341.
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Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe

340.
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Sands, Judicial Selectionfor InternationalCourts:
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214.
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significant power with wide-ranging effects. 343 Generally, most of the
international and regional tribunals take a similar approach to appointing
judges: member states each nominate a candidate, which is voted on by the
organization as a whole. 34
In the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, for example, each
member state is allowed to nominate up to two candidates. 345 After
nomination, the judicial candidates are then voted on by secret ballot by all
the parties to the Court. 346 Those elected not only have to win the largest
number of votes, but also have to be elected by a two-thirds majority of
member states.4 7 Additionally, the African Court of Human and People's
Rights elects its judges in a similar manner: member states nominate up to
three candidates, two of whom must be nationals of the nominating state. 4
Nominated candidates are then voted on by the Assembly of Heads of
States and the Government of the African Union. 349 Finally, the European
Court of Human Rights selects its judges by allowing the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe to vote on judicial candidates nominated by member states.35 °
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) warrants further inspection as
the longest standing international court and as an example of the problems
inherent in the widely used selection system most used by international
courts. 351 The ICJ acts as a "world court" from its home in The Hague, the
Netherlands.352 It resolves disputes between member states of the United
343.
Id. For example, the World Trade Organization has an Appellate Body for
adjudicating trade disputes between member states. The International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea operates in Hamburg and recently prohibited Japan from fishing southern blue-fin
tuna. Additionally, an international court in Washington D.C. itself, the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights, ordered a stop to the human rights violations in Guantanamo
Bay. Id.
344.
Id. at 220.
345.
Id.
346.
Id.
347.
MacKenzie & Sands, supra note 342, at 220.
348.
Id. at 221.
349.
Id. at 220.
350.
Id. One exception to these general models of nomination by each member state
and then voting by the general assembly is the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the tribunal
for the European Union. In the instance of the ECJ, each member state is responsible for
selecting a judge, who is then appointed by "common accord." In addition to the judges,
there are nine advocates general, five who are selected by the five largest member states
while the remainder is appointed by rotating states. Martin Shapiro, The European Court of
Justice, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE INTHE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 35, at 273, 281.
351.
The International Court of Justice Handbook 9 (I.C.J., 5th ed. 2004) available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibleubook.pdf. The ICJ has been in
existence since 1945 when it was created under the Charter of the United Nations.
352.
Id.
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Nations, along with issuing advisory opinions in limited cases. 353 The
fifteen judges of the ICJ are elected by the member states of the United
Nations. 35 4 Both the Security Council and the General Assembly vote on
judicial candidates and candidates need an absolute majority vote in both
the Security Council and the General Assembly in order to be appointed. 355
Like many other international and regional courts, member states to the
United Nations have the right to propose candidates for election, up to four
candidates, only two of which can be of the same nationality of the
nominating state.356 The Court cannot have more than one judge of a single
nationality, despite the fact that once elected, ICJ judges are no longer
considered representatives of their states and are expected to be completely
impartial.357
Although this is the selection method utilized by several inter-country
tribunals, several problems arise from this selection method. 8 Elections to
the ICJ have been characterized as "highly politicized affairs. ' 359 In order
to get the judge of their choice elected, member states engage in "lobbying"
and "vote-trading. ' ' 36 0 The election of judges often involves several
informal and formal meetings between diplomats, each using any political
clout they can muster to support their candidate.361 Votes promised for a
judicial candidate are then exchanged for support in another matter before
the United Nations. 362 These problems are similar to some of those
plaguing the United States where judicial nominating commissions are
"highly politicized affairs," and commission members engage in votetrading.
A new regional court has developed an alternative to the common
model of nomination by a member state with election by all member states.
In 2001, the English speaking, newly-independent British colonies signed
36
an agreement establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). 4
Previously, newly independent colonies still relied on Great Britain's Privy

353.
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354.
Id. at 23.
355.
Id.
356.
Id. at 24.
Id.
357.
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Leonard Birdsong, The Formation of the Caribbean Court of Justice: The
Sunset of the British Colonial Rule in the English Speaking Caribbean,36 U. MIAMi INTERAM. L. REv. 197, 199 (2005).
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Council as a final appellate court.365 The new CCJ has two functions: (1) to
serve as a final court of appeals that would replace the Privy Council; and
(2) to serve as a new international court for the region. 366 Those designing
the new tribunal chose not to allow member states to directly appoint or
elect judges, instead creating a Regional Judicial and Legal Services
Commission.367
The new Commission is composed of eleven members.368 The members include:
[T]he Court President, who is the Chairman of the Commission;
two persons appointed jointly by the Organisation of the Commonwealth Bar Association and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean
States Bar Association; one chairman of the Judicial & Legal Service Commission of a Contracting Party; one chairman of the Public Service Commission of a Contracting Party; two persons from
civil society nominated jointly by the Secretary General of the
Community and the Director-General of the OECS; two distinguished jurists nominated jointly by the Dean of the Faculty of Law
of any of the Contracting Parties and the Chairman of the Council
of Legal Education; and two persons nominating
jointly by the Bar
3 69
or Law Associations of the Contracting Parties.
It is the responsibility of this Commission to recommend the President of
the Court, who is eventually appointed by the Heads of Governments of
member
states. 370 The Commission also appoints all other judges to the
1
CCJ.

37

The model used by the CCJ, as opposed to the ICJ and many other
international courts, may prove to be the selection method that more
effectively chooses judges based on qualifications. When member states of
any international organization trade favors in highly secret meetings,
politics will continue to infest the judiciary. Providing for a completely
separate commission with a sole purpose of appointing judges allows

365.
Id. at 198. The Privy Council is part of the House of Lords in London, England
who reviews lower court decisions to determine if errors occurred. Id. at 198 n. 9.
366.
Id. at 200.
367.
Id. at 213.
368.
The Caribbean Court of Justice, About the Caribbean Court of Justice,
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/about.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
369.
Id.
370.
Id.
371.
Id. The Commission also appoints other officials and employees of the court,
along with determining the salaries of judges and rules for termination of judges on the CCJ.
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commission members the freedom to choose truly qualified judges without
the hindrance of politics, thereby ensuring a more independent judiciary.
V.

SOLUTIONS

It is clear that no one solution will fit the needs of every state. It is
clear, however, that states that regularly elect their judges need to consider
an alternative means of filling the ranks. Under current judicial elections,
judicial independence is being sacrificed for judicial accountability. The
constitutional rights of every litigant that comes before an elected judge are
at risk of not being judged by the law, but by the current public opinion poll
of the day. To alleviate these problems, I propose a selection system that is
based on several different foreign selection methods, a selection system that
takes the strongest component from each country so as to correctly balance
accountability with independence.
The first component is borrowed from South Africa: their extensively
public Judicial Service Commission.372 This committee significantly
increased the racial diversity of the bench, thereby establishing the
legitimacy of the bench. In an age of public opinion that does not believe in
the legitimacy of the court,373 it is especially important to revitalize public
confidence in the judiciary. This can be achieved by states adopting a
judicial commission, but additionally conducting the selection processes in
public. South Africa posts advertisements when a vacancy arises; 37 4 if U.S.
states were to also do this, not only would the diversity of the bench
increase, but the public would stop perceiving the bench as a result of
"cronyism."
In addition to the publicizing of vacancies, the new judicial commissions should also publicly interview the candidates. As part of this process,
the commission should invite comments from the public as to any
questions, concerns, or comments about the judiciary. This will invite
participation in the process that is far superior to an election, because the
people that will choose to participate are those that are knowledgeable and
those that care. Finally, this process will bring to light a candidate's
qualifications in a more objective manner, instead of the usual biased
television advertisements that are paid for by those appearing before the
bench.
The composition of an appropriate judicial service commission would
best be modeled after the South African example. In South Africa, the JSC
was composed of twenty-three members from the judicial, legislative, and
372.

Discussed supra at p. 481-82.

374.

Du Bois, supra note 297, at 288.

373.

See supra p. 447.
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executive branches. 7 5 This representation reflects the interests that all
three branches have in the quality of the judiciary. A multi-branch
composition also provides that the people's elected officials, who best
represent the people's interests, can ensure some accountability in the
choice of candidates to the bench.
Once the committee publicizes the vacancies, hears comments from
the public, and interviews candidates, it should make its recommendations
to both the legislative and executive branches. Both branches should
approve of the candidate before the judge is placed in office. This
component can be borrowed from the People's Republic of China or even
from our own federal government. Providing both the legislative branch
and the executive branch a chance to approve a judicial candidate gives the
people the accountability for which they so clamor. If voters become
unhappy with the judicial branch, all they must do is vote their elected
officials out of office in the next election. Additionally, judges are still held
accountable once on the bench through impeachment proceedings and the
appeals process. With the approval requirement by the executive and
legislative branches, along with the accountability procedures already in
place, a state's citizens can be assured that judges will be held accountable.
The question of tenure also arises. Retention elections were an attempt at providing the public with a "veto" power and judges with near life
tenure; however, this seems to have failed. In recent years, retention
elections have been characterized as highly political battles dominated by
special interest groups. These retention elections do not reflect the will of
the people, but instead reflect the will of those with the biggest pocketbook.
To cure these ails, life tenure would be the best option for avoiding the
behavioral changes seen in judges as elections near, and for avoiding the
improper influence of money during the campaign season. Life tenure
ensures that judges would be free to rule in accordance with the law and
would also ensure that our constitutional democracy is protected. Life
tenure can also be subject to "good behavior," ensuring that unqualified
judges can always be removed, and thus providing the populace with their
accountability.
Many states will never adopt life tenure for their judges. In response
to this, Connecticut's model of retention may be the best model of retention
to follow, as it provides some security for judges. Connecticut provides
that upon expiration of a judge's term, the judicial review council will
submit a recommendation concerning the reappointment of the judge to the
governor, the judicial selection commission, and to the standing committees

375.

S. AFR. CONST. §178; see supra at pp. 481-82.
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of the judiciary in the House of Representatives and the Senate.37 6 This
provides the public with the "veto" they so desire, but it also softens the
influence of special interest groups. In order for a judge to not be retained,
many different people will have to be convinced, who will ideally take the
time to examine the concerns fully, and not rely on multi-million dollar
campaigns run by special interest groups. This method of retention will be
more fair, more representative, and more secure for the judges themselves,
allowing judges to exercise their power in accordance with the law.
A judicial selection system that employs a multi-branch judicial selection commission, who publicly advertises vacancies, publicly interviews
candidates, and hears concerns from the public, will insulate the judiciary
from the public, providing for more independence. When coupled with a
mechanism that allows for approval by both the executive and legislative
branches of government, this will ensure that both accountability and
independence are properly balanced in order to ensure a properly functioning judiciary that retains the trust of the people. Finally, life tenure or
presumed retention will ensure that judges do not submit to the "sword of
public opinion" and instead have the confidence to rule based on the facts
and the law. This tri-partite system will eliminate many of the problems
associated with judicial elections, and instead balance both judicial
independence and public accountability.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Judicial elections have become "nosier, nastier, and costlier" as courts
become more politicized and the public demands more.377 These judicial
elections threaten both the independence and the impartiality of the
judiciary. Donations to a judge's campaign threaten the impartiality of the
judge, while changes in a judge's conduct as elections near violate a
litigant's rights under the law. In order to combat these problems, states
need to look to other selection systems and adopt the strengths of those
systems into their own scheme for electing judges. States must learn to
adapt their current selection systems, or instead pay the high cost of a
corrupt and dependent judiciary: "the scourge of an angry heaven."
KELLY J. VARSHO*
376.
See CONN. CONST. ART. V §2; CONN. GEN. STAT. §2-40 (2004); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §51-44 (2004); see also Appendix One at pp. 492-94.
377.
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APPENDIX ONE: VARIATIONS ON STATE SELECTION METHODS
TABLE 3: VARIATIONS ON STATE SELECTION METHODS

State

Selection Method

References

California

California uses a "reverse merit system."
Judges are appointed by the governor and
are then confirmed by the Commission
on Judicial Nominees Evaluation. Judges
are then subject to retention elections.

CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 7;
American Judicature
Society, California,
http://www.aj s.orglj s/CA
.htm (last visited Mar.
31, 2007).

The governor nominates judges from a
list submitted by the judicial selection
commission, who is then appointed by

Connecticut

Delaware

the general assembly. For retention, the
judicial review council submits
recommendations concerning the
nomination for reappointment of any
judge to the governor, the judicial
selection commission, and to the standing
committees of the judiciary in the house
of representatives and the senate.
Appointments are made by the governor
from a list of nominees submitted by a
judicial nominating commission. The
is subject to the consent of
appointment
the senate.
Judges are elected in partisan elections

Illinois

and then subject to retention elections.

Illinois is also different in that they
require a 60% voter approval rate for a
judge to be retained.

Indiana

Massachusetts

Circuit Courts and Superior Courts select
their judges through partisan elections.

Judges are appointed by the governor
from a list of nominees submitted by the
judicial nominating commission and then
confirmed by a governor's council which
is elected by Massachusetts' legislature.

CONN. CONST. art. V, §

2;
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2-40
(2004);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5144(a) (2004).

DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3;
30;
T
d
D
D1303;
§ 1303;
Del. Exec. Order No. 4.
ILL. CONST. a.

6, § 12.

IND. CODE § 33-28-2-1
(2004);
IND. CODE § 33-29-1-2
(2004).

MASS. CONST. pt. 2, cl. 2,
§1, art. IX;
Executive Order No.
477;
American Judicature
Society, Massachusetts,
http://www.ajs.org/js/M
A.htm (last visited Mar
31, 2007).
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TABLE 3: VARIATIONS ON STATE SELECTION METHODS

State

Selection Method

References

New Hampshire

Judges are nominated by the governor
and affirmed by a majority vote of a fivemember executive council. The council
members are elected by the general
population.

N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art.
46;
American Judicature
Society, New Hampshire,
http://www.ajs.org/js/NH
.htm (last visited Mar 31,

Judges are appointed by the governor
from a list provided by a nominating
commission. At the first general election
following appointment, judges run on a
partisan ballot. If the appointee wins the
elections, he or she is subject to retention
elections.

N.M. CONST. art. VI, §
33;
N.M. CONST. art. VI, §
35;
American Judicature
Society, New Mexico,
http://www.ajs.org/js/N
M.htm (last visited Mar

For the Court of Appeals and the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court,
the governor appoints the judge from a
list provided by the judicial nominating
commission. At the end of the term, the
judge must be re-appointed. Supreme
Court judges (along with some
specialized courts) are subject to partisan

N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §2;
N.Y. Judiciary Law, art.
3-A;
American Judicature
Society, New York,
http://www.ajs.orgljs/NY
htm (last visited Mar 31,
2007).

New Mexico

New York

Oklahoma

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South Dakota

Tennessee

elections.
District Court judges are elected in
nonpartisan elections.

2007).

31, 2007).

OKLA. CONST. art. 7, §9.

Judges are elected in partisan elections
and subject to retention elections
thereafter.
Supreme Court judges are elected by the
two houses of the legislature and serve
during good behavior. Superior Court,
District Court, and Family Court judges
are appointed by the governor, subject to
confirmation by the Senate.
After gubernatorial appointment, judges
are subject to retention elections. Circuit
court judges are elected by nonpartisan
elections.

PA. CONST. art. 5, § 13;
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§3153 (2004).
R.I. CONST. art. 10, §4;
American Judicature
Society, Rhode Island,
http://www.ajs.org/js/Rl.
htm (last visited Mar 31,
2007).

Judges are elected in territorial districts.
For Supreme Court judges, two judges
are elected by the state at large while
three districts each elect one more judge.

TENN. CONST. art. 6, §3;
TENN. CONST. art. 6, §4;
Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-1103.

S.D. CONST. art. V, §7.
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[

State

Selection Method

Vermont

The governor appoints judges from a list
provided by the judicial nominating
board, who are then subject to the advice
and consent of the senate. At the
expiration of a judge's term, the judge
continues in office unless a majority of
the general assembly votes against the
judge continuing in office.

References

Vt. Const. Ch. 11, §32.
Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 4,
§60 (West 20.
(West 2005).
§602
Ann. Tit. 4,
Vt. Stat.
§603 (West 2005).
Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 4,
§444 (West 2005).
§_44_(West_2005).

APPENDIX Two: WORLD SELECTION METHODS

TABLE 4: WORLD SELECTION METHODS

Country

Afghanistan

Albania

Algeria

Andorra

Selection Method
judges after
a
jugsatr
Peietappoints
The President
nomination by the Supreme Court.

The members of the High Court are
appointed by the President of the
Republic with the consent of the
Assembly. The other judges are
appointed by the President after
recommendation by the High Council
of Justice.
The Supreme Judicial Council appoints
magistrates.

Judges are appointed by the High
Judicial Council via a public
competitive examination.

References
Katherine McCullough, Out
In WithFor
The
And
With The
Long
Struggle
The Old
New:
Afghaniudia efon
JudicialReform In Afghanistan, 19 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
821, 825 (2006).
ALBANIA CONST.
art. 136
available at
http://www.ipls.org/services/k
usht/cp9.html.
ALGERIA CONST. art. 155

availableat
http://www.pogar.org/publicati
ons/judiciary/nbrown/algeria.h
tml.
Group of States Against
Corruption, Evaluation Report
on Andorra 8 (2006),
http://www.coe.int/t/dg I/greco
/evaluations/round2/GrecoEval
1-2(2006) lAndorraEN.pdf.

Angola

The High Council appoints, places,
transfers and promotes judges.

ANGOLA CONST. art. 132

availableat
http://www.embangola.at/judic
I iary.htm.
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TABLE 4: WORLD SELECTION METHODS

Country

Selection Method

Argentina

The president appoints federal judges
with confirmation of two-thirds of the
Senate.

Armenia

Australia

Azerbaijan

The
Bahamas

Bahrain

The President of Armenia appoints all
judges after recommendation by the
Minister of Justice and the Council of
Justice.

The Governor-General appoints federal
the executive
judges. In the states, judges.
branch also appoints

Every citizen that wants a judicial post
applies to the Judicial Legal Council.
The Judicial Legal Council then
examines the candidate's credentials
and conducts and interview. The
Judicial Legal Council then makes a
recommendation to the President, who
then makes the appointment.
Judges are appointed by the GovernorGeneral acting on the advice of the
Judicial and Legal Services
Commission.

Judges of the High courts are
nominated by the Ministry of Justice
appointed by the Emir. Judges of
and
the middle and lower courts are
nominated by the Ministry of Justice
and appointed by the prime minister.
and apiebyhprevisited

Bangladesh

The President appoints judges. The
President has the power to promote
and discipline which is exercised in
consultation with the Supreme Court.

References
Daniel Brinks, JudicialReform
And Independence In Brazil
And Argentina: The Beginning
OfA New Millennium?, 40
TEX. INT'L L.J. 595,
606 (2005).
ARMENIA CONST. art. 95(1),
55(11)
availableat
www.abanet.org/ceeli/publicati
ons/jri/jri-armenia_2005_eng.
pdf.
John M. Williams, Judicial
Independence in Australia,in
JUDICIAL. INDEPENDENCE IN THE
NDNC: ITE
A OF
PESECIES FROM C
PERSPECTIVES FROM AOUND
THE WORLD 173, 175 (Peter H.
Russell & David M. O'Brien
eds., 2001).
Council of Europe, Evaluation
of Azerbaijan Judicial System
9 (2002),
http://www.coe.int/t/dgl/legalc
ooperation/cepej/evaluation/2002Aze
rbaijan.pdf.
The Permanent Mission of the
Commonwealth of the
Bahamas to the United
Nations, Bahamas Government
Information,
http://www.un.intbahamas/Ba
hamasGovernmentInfo.htm
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
United Nations Development
Programme, Programme on
Governance in the Arab
Region, Judiciary: Bahrain,
http://www.pogar.org/countrie
s/judiciary.asp?cid=2 (last
Apr. 10, 2007).
BANGLADESH CONST.
art. 95(1), 115, 116.
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Country

Barbados

Selection Method
Lower court judges are appointed by
the Governor General with the Board
of the Judicial and Legal Services
Commission.

References
Justice Studies Center of the
Americas, Report on Judicial
Systems in the Americas 73
(2004-2005),
http://www.cejamericas.org/re
porte/pdfing/4BARBADOS ING.pdf.

Belarus

Belgium

Belize

Benin

Bermuda

Bhutan

The president appoints half of the
Constitutional Court while the other
six are appointed by the Council of the
Republic. The president also appoints
and
the judges of the Supreme Court
with
along
Court,
Supreme Economic
all military and district judges.
The King appoints Justices of the
Peace, judges of superior courts,
judges of the administrative courts,
and judges of the Court of Cassation.
The Governor-General appoints judges
of the Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeal with the approval of the Prime
Minister after consultation with the
Leader of the Opposition.
Most judges are trained at the National
School of Administration. After
training, judges are appointed by the
President after recommendation by the
Higher Council of Judges.
The Chief Justice is appointed by the
Governor after consulting the Premier
and the Opposition Leader. The other
Judges of the Supreme Court are
appointed by the Governor after
consultation with the Chief Justice.
The judges of the Court of Appeal are
appointed by the Governor.
The justices of the Supreme Court and
High Court are appointed by the King
upon the recommendation of the
National Judicial Commission,

Freedom House, Country
Report: Belarus, 2005
http://www.freedomhouse.org/
tenm
year=2005&display=law
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclo
pedia_761553191_7/Belarus.htm
I (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
BELGIUM CONST.

art. 151(1), 4.

Attorney General's Ministry,
Our View of the Judiciary
System in Belize,
http://www.belizelaw.org/judic
iary.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2007).
Michel Tchanou, Judicial
Reform: Indispensablehttp://ospiti.peacelink.itlan
b-bia/nr337/e0l.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2007).

BERMUDA CONST.

art. 73, 77.

Royal Court of Justice,
Judiciary of Bhutan,
http://www.judiciary.gov.bt/ht
mlljudiciary/justice.php (last
visited Apr. 10, 2007).
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TABLE 4: WORLD SELECTION METHODS

Country

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

Botswana

Selection Method
In the Federation, the Federal
Commission for the Election and
Appointment of Judges and ten
cantonal commissions recommend
candidates to those officials
responsible for appointing judges. In
the Republika Srpska the High Judicial
Council proposes candidates for all
judicial vacancies to the Republika
Srpska National Assembly. The Brcko
Judicial Commission directly appoints
all Brcko judges.
The Chief Justice and the President of
the Court of Appeals are appointed by
the President. The other judges of the
High Court and Court of Appeals are
appointed by the President, acting in
accordance with the advice of the
Judicial Service Commission. The
President appoints lower court judges
in accordance with the advice of the

References
American Bar Association,
Central and East European
Law Initiative, Judicial Reform
Index for Bosnia and
Herzegovina 3 (2001),
available at
http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/g
roups/public/documents/UNT
C/UNPAN017558.pdf.

BOTSWANA CONST.
art. 96, 100, 104.

Judicial Service Commission.

Brazil

Judges are appointed to the
constitutional court by the president
with the approval of a simple majority
of the Senate. Lower court judges
have to pass both an exam and
personal interview before being
admitted to the judiciary. These
judges are appointed by the president
from a list of candidates submitted by
either the constitutional court itself or
by majority vote of the national bar
association and national prosecutors'
association.

Bulgaria

BRAZIL CONST.
art. 101, 104, 111-A.

The Supreme Judicial Council appoints
all judges in Bulgaria. The twenty five
members of the Supreme Judicial
Council are elected by the National
Assembly, the bodies of the judicial

Reform, Judicial Assessment,
11(1999), available at

branch, the Chairmen of the Supreme
Courts of Cassation, and the Chief

roups/public/documents/UNT
C/UNPAN017020.pdf.

Prosecutor.

Alex Iorio & Galina Mikhlin,
Bulgaria: Legal and Judicial
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Burma

References

Selection Method

Country

Judges are appointed by the President
is approved
his nomination
after Houses
Chief
both
of Parliament
as the by
C
a
bosthiHe of P the

Myint Zan, Judicial
Independence in Burna: No
March Backwards Towards
th P a1oN rds a.L.

the Past, I ASIAN-PAC. L. &

POL'Y J., 30 available at
http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/p
dfs/05-zan.pdf.

Burundi

Cambodia

The executive branch appoints judges.
The government appoints judges after
recommendation by the judges of the
higher courts. The higher court judges
sit on committees that nominate lower
court judges and request the
government to appoint these judges.
The chief justice makes the
recommendations for appointments to
higher courts.

Cameroon

Canada

Judges are appointed by the President.

The Prime Minister makes appointments to the Supreme Court, the
Federal Court, and the Tax Court.
Provincial governments appoint all

judges of the provincial courts.

Cape Verde

The Supreme Court has five members,
one appointed by the president, one
appointed by the National Assembly,
and three appointed by the Supreme
Council of Magistrates. The Ministry
of Justice and Labor appoints local

judges.

Neil J. Kritz, The Problem of
Impunity and JudicialReform
in Burundi, The United States
Institute of Peace, available at
http://129.194.252.80/catfiles/
0817.pdf.

Seminar on Cambodian
Judiciary: Independence of the
Judiciary, Lecture by Justice
H. Suresh, availableat
http://www.ahrchk.net/pub/mai
nfile.php/cambodia-judiciary/
110/.
Valentin Sim6on Zinga,
Cameroon: Judicial Power Just a Statement,
http://ospiti.peacelink.it/anbbia/nr337/e04.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2007).
F.L. Morton, Judicial
Appointments in Post-Charter
Canada:A System in
Transition, in APPOINTING
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL

POWER 56, 57 (Kate Malleson
& Peter H. Russel, eds., 2006).
Encyclopedia of the Nations,
Cape Verde: Judicial System,
http://www.nationsencyclopedi
a.com/ricaCape-VerdeJUDICIAL-SYSTEM.htoar
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
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TABLE 4: WORLD SELECTION METHODS

Country

Selection Method

References

Cayman
Islands

Judges of the Grand Court and the
Court of Appeal are appointed with
instructions from the secretary of state
of the United Kingdom on behalf of
the Queen. The governor, on the
advice of the secretary of state,
appoints one of the judges to be the
chief justice. The governor appoints
magistrates on the advice of the chief
justice.

Cayman Islands Government,
The Judicial Branch,
http://www.gov.ky/portal/page
?_pageid= 1142,1481290&_da
d=portal&_schema=PORTAL
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007).

Central
African
Rpuic
Republic

Chad

Judges are appointed by the president
Jch/features/index/country.cfm?

Magistrates are appointed by the
president.
Corte Suprema: judges are appointed
by the president and approved by the
Senate from lists of candidates
provided by the court; the president of
the Supreme Court is elected by the
20-member court.

China

Comoros

Congo,
Democratic
Republic of
the

The People's Congress at the same
jurisdiction of the court appoints the
judges to that court.
The Constitutional Court includes a
member appointed by the president of
the Union, a member appointed by
each of the two vice presidents, a
member appointed by each of the three
island government presidents, and a
member appointed by the president of
the National Assembly. The head of
state appoints magistrates.

The President appoints magistrates.

Index of Economic Freedom,
Central African Republic,
http://www.heritage.org/resear
id=CentralAfricanRepublic
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
Index of Economic Freedom,
Chad,
http://www.heritage.org/resear
ch/features/index/country.cfm?
id=Chad (last visited Apr. 10,
2007).
CIA World Factbook, Chile,
https://www.cia.gov/cialpublic
ations/factbook/print/ci.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
Greg R. Avino, China's
Judiciary:An Instrumentof
Democratic Change?, 22
PENN. ST. INT'L L. REv. 369,
379.

United States Department of
State, 2006 Country Report on
Human Rights Practices,
Comoros,
http://www.state.gov/gldrllrlsl
hrrpt/200678727.htm (last
visited Apr. 10, 2007).
International Commission of
Jurists, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, 119
http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/co
ngo.pdf.
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Country

Selection Method

Congo,
Republic of
the

The President appoints the members of
the Supreme Court and the magistrates
on the proposal of the National
Council of the Magistrature.

References
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Cook Islands

The Chief Justice of the High Court is
appointed by the Queen, acting on the
advice of the Executive Council
tendered by the Prime Minister. Other
Judges are appointed by the Queen's
Representative, acting on the advice of
the Executive Council and the Chief
Justice of the High Court and the
Minister of Justice.

Costa Rica

Justices of lower courts are appointed
by the Supreme Court. Justices of the
peace are appointed by the minister of
government acting for the president.

Cote d'Ivoire

Judges are appointed by the Executive:
either directly
from
the
lgalNot
te legal
fomdrecty
eithr
profession or from those who have
th
appropriate training and
the appopratetraiingand
completed compete
passed the necessary examinations.

Croatia

Judges for both the Supreme Court and
the Constitutional Court are appointed
by the Judicial Council of the
Republic. The State Judicial Council
appoints judges. It consists of eleven
members elected from among judges,
attorneys, and university professors.

Cuba

The Ministry of Justice screens
candidates and then forwards their
recommendation to the appropriate
legislative body for appointment:
Municipal Assemblies for municipal
judges; Provincial Assemblies for
provincial courts; and the National
Assembly for the Supreme Court.

CONST. art. 141, availableat
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hr-do
cs/constitutions/docs/CongoC
%20(english%20summary)(rev
).doc.
Governmcnt of the Cook
Islands, Judiciary,
http://www.ck/govt.htm#jud
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
CIA World Factbook, Costa
Rica,
https://www.cia.gov/cia/public
ations/factbookprintcs.htm
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007);
Encyclopedia of the Nations,
Costa Rica,
http://www.nationsencyclopedi
a.com/Americas/Costa-RicaJUDICIAL-SYSTEM.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
Alphonse QuInum, Justice Impartial and
Certainly
Always
Vulnerable,
http://ospiti.peacelink.it/anbbialnr337/e08.html
(last visited
Ar 10, 2007).
Apr. 10, 2007).
CIA World Factbook, Croatia,
https://www.cia.gov/cia/public
ations/factbook/print/hr.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007);
Croatia Homepage, Judicial
Power,
http://www.hr/croatia/state/jud
icial (last visited Apr. 10,
2007).

Gerard J. Clark, The Legal
Profession in Cuba, 23
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
413, 424 (2000).
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TABLE

Country

Cyprus

Czech
Republic

4:

WORLD SELECTION METHODS

Selection Method
Supreme Court Judges are appointed

by the President. Other judges are
appointed by the Supreme Council of
Cyprs apoited
y te Sprem Conci of
Judicature which is composed of the
members of the Supreme Court.

CyprusNet.Com, Cyprus
Judiciary System
http://www.cyprusnet.com/con
tent.php?article id=2804&subj
ect=standalone (last visited
10, 2007).
Apr.
Apr. 10, 2007).

The President appoints judges
following an apprenticeship,
examination, and evaluation by the
court president. In practice, Minister
of Justice nominates each judicial
candidate, based on a recommendation
from the president of the court on

Open Society Institute, Judicial
Independence in the Czech
Republic 135 (2001), available
R0
at
200/judicialsections/czechju
dicialczech.pdf.

which the candidate will be assigned.

Denmark

Dominican
Republic

East Timor

Egypt

References

The Supreme Court is appointed by the
Crown with the government's
recommendation.

Justices of the Supreme Court are
appointed by the National Council of
the Magistracy. Other judges are
appointed by the Supreme Court.
The President of the Supreme Court is
appointed by the President. The
Superior Council for the Judiciary and
appoints all other judges.
The president appoints all judges based
on nominations by the Supreme
Judicial Council.

_

czehpdf.

Jurist: Legal Intelligence,
Denmark,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/
denmark.htm (last visited Apr.
10, 2007).
International Commission of
Jurists, Dominican Republic Attacks of Justice 2000,
http://www.icj.org/news.php3?
idarticle=2565&lang=en (last
visited Apr. 10, 2007).

EAST TIMOR CONST. S. 124,
125,available at
http://www.etan.org/etanpdf/p
df2/constfnen.pdf.
Encyclopedia of the Nations,
Egypt, Judicial System,
http://www.nationsencyclopedi
a.com/Africa/EgyptfiaEyt
acm
JUDICIAL-SYSTEM.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).

El Salvador

The Supreme Court selects justices of
the peace, trial judges, and appellate
judges from a list of nominees
proposed by the National Judicial
Council.

U.S. Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor,
Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, El Salvador,
Mar. 8, 2006
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2005/61727.htm (last
visited Mar. 30, 2007).
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Country

Eritrea

Selection Method
"The President shall have the
following powers and duties:...
appoint justices of the Supreme Court
Comsinand
of the
upon
proposal of approval
the Judicial
Service
Commission aonstitu/other/eritrea/eritreNational Assembly; appoint judges of
the lower courts upon proposal of the

References
ERITREA CONST. art. 42
aaC
aT r
www.trybunal.gov.pllconstitlc
availablp
e.htm.

Judicial Service Conunission."

Estonia

Ethiopia

The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court is nominated by the president
and confirmed by the Parliament. The
Chief Justice, in turn, nominates the
Supreme Court judges who are then
confirmed by Parliament. The Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court also
nominates lower court judges who are
then appointed by the president.
Judges who serve in the Federal Court
system are appointed by the Federal
Parliament. Those in the Regional
State Courts are appointed by their
respective Regional Administrative
Councils.
For the European Court of Justice
(ECJ), each member state is
responsible for selecting a judge, who

European

Union

Fiji

Encyclopedia of the Nations,
Estonia: Judicial System,
http://www.nationsencyclopedi
a.com/Europe/Estonia(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
Lammii Guddaa, Ethiopia: A
Judiciary - without justice,
http://ospiti.peacelink.it/anbbianr337/eo9.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2007).
Martin Shapiro, The European
Court of Justice, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE , iTIH AGE OF

is then appointed by "common

DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL

appointed by rotating states.

eds.,_2001).

accord." In addition to the judges,
there are nine advocates general, five
who are selected by the five largest
member states while the remainder is
The Chief Justice is appointed by the
President on the advice of the Prime
Minister, who is required to consult
with the Leader of the Opposition.
The judges of the Supreme Court, the
President of the Court of Appeal, the
Justices of Appeal are appointed by the
President, after nomination by the
Judicial Service Commission. The
Judicial Service Commission appoints
Magistrates and any other judicial
offices that may be established by
Parliament.

PERCYV
PERSPECTIVES FROMIA
FROM AROUND
THE WORLD 273, 281 (Peter H.
Russell & David M. O'Brien
eds., 2001).

Fill
t
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/la
//wwwJservathuni.
w/iclfj00000_.html.
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TABLE

4:

WORLD SELECTION METHODS

Country

Selection Method

Finland

Judges are appointed by the President
of the Republic. The courts of first
instance also have some locally elected
lay judges.

France

Upon graduating from the National
School for the Judiciary, Ecole
Nationale de la Magistrature(ENM)
graduates take an examination. Those
with the highest ranking scores pick
first from a list of vacancies provided
by the Ministry of Justice.

Gabon

The President appoints judges through
the Ministry of Justice.

Georgia

The president of Georgia, based on the
recommendation of the High Council
of Justice, appoints all judges.
Supreme Court judges must also be
confirmed by Parliament.
Judges in Germany are professional
judges whoyea
follow
an intensive
threewo
corseof
tudes
ollwedby
year course of studies followed by two

Germany

years of training. Each of the two

phases is followed by written and oral
examinations. Ministries of Justice
and nominating commissions play a
large role in recruiting those judges
that pass both phases and their
examinations.

References
The Finland Ministry of
Justice, The Judicial System of
Finland,
http://www.om.filEtusivu/Mini
sterio/Oikeuslaitosesite?lang=en
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
Doris Marie Provine &
Antoine Garapon, The
Selection of Judges in France:
Searchingfor a New
Legitimacy, in APPOINTING
JUDGES INAN AGE OF JUDICIAL
POWER 176, 183 (Kate
Malleson & Peter H. Russel,
eds., 2006).

U.S. Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor,
Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, Gabon, Feb.
28, 2005
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2004/41604.htm (last
visited Mar. 30, 2007).
American Bar Association,
Central European and Eurasian
Law Initiative, Legal
Information for Georgia,
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/co
untries/georgia/legalinfo.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
Donald P. Kommers,
Don
om
ers,AccountabilAutonomy
versus
ity: The German Judiciary,in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE INTHE
AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL
PERSPE vEs FROM AROUND
THE WORLD 131, 143 (Peter H.
Russell & David M. O'Brien
eds., 2001).
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Ghana

Greece

Grenada

Guatemala

Honduras

Hong Kong

Hungary

Selection Method
The justices of the Supreme Court are
appointed by the President acting in
consultation with the Council of State
and with the approval of Parliament.
Justices of the Court of Appeal and of
the High Court and Chairmen of
Regional Tribunals are appointed by
the President acting on the advice of
the judicial Council.

References

GHANA CONST. ar. 1
available at
a
Gconst.html.

CIA
World Fact Book, Greece,
https://www.cia.gov/cialpublic
All judges are appointed by the
htps/wacovcia/publ
a
with
consultation
after
president
judical concil.ations/factbook/print/gr.htmil
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
judicial council.
The governor-general appoints the
ppontsthe
The ovenorgenral
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on
the advice of the Prime Minister and
the Leader of the Opposition. The
governor-general appoints the other
justices with the advice of a judicial
commission

Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, United Nations,
UiAdmins
Grenada
suy20
tion C ury Proi

Judges of the Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeals are elected by the
National Congress from lists prepared
by active magistrates, the Bar
Association and law school deans.
Other judges are appointed by the
Supreme Court.
The justices of the Supreme Court are
elected by the National Assembly.
The Supreme Court appoints the
judges of the courts of appeal and the
courts of first instance, who appoint
local justices of the peace.
"Judges of the courts of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region
shall be appointed by the Chief
Executive on the recommendation of
an independent commission composed
of local judges, persons from the legal
profession and eminent persons from
other sectors."
In Hungary judges are appointed by
the President. The President appoints
a judge after recommendation of the
president of the county court and
proposal by the National Council of
Justice.

Encyclopedia of Nations,
Guatemala: Judicial System,
http://www.nationsencyclopedi
a.com/Americas/GuatemalaJUDICIAL.SYSTEM.htni
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).

availableat
http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/g
roups/public/documents/UN/U
NPAN023694.pdf.

Encyclopedia of Nations,
Honduras: Judicial System,
http://www.nationsencyclopedi
a.com/Americas/HondurasJUDICIAL-SYSTEM.html
(last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
The Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People' s
available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/basic
aw/flash.html.
The Supreme Court of
Hungary, The Hungarian
Judicial System,
http://www.lb.hu/englishlindex
.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2007).
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Country

Selection Method

Iceland

Supreme Court justices and district
judges are appointed for life by
court
the Minister of Justice.

India

The Supreme Court of India is
appointed by the President of India.
The justices of the high courts are
appointed by the President after
consultation with the Chief Justice and
the Governor of the State. For pusine
judges, the President appoints judges
after consultation with the Chief
Justice of the
Supreme
the
Justce
Surem
f th Court,
Cout 'the
Governor of the State, and the Chief

Iran

The head of the judiciary is appointed
by the Supreme Leader. The head of
the judiciary appoints all other
members of the Supreme Court, and
the chief judges in all of Iran's
provinces. The head of the judiciary is
authorized to appoint all other judges.

T

References
CIA World Factbook, Iceland,
cagov/cand,
/
h
https://www.cia.gov/cia/public
ations/factbook/geosic.htm]
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
Supreme Court of India, Law,
ourts and the Constitution,
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.
in/news/constitution.htm (last
visited Apr. 10, 2007); Indian
Courts, Indian Judiciary,
http://indiancourts.nic.in/ (last
visited Apr. 10, 2007).

Justice of the High Court.

Ireland

Judges are appointed by the president
on the advice of the government.

International Commission of
Jurists, Iran: Attacks on
Justice 197, availableat
http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/ira
n.pdf.
Encyclopedia of Nations,
Ireland: Judicial System,
http://www.nationsencyclopedi
a.com/Europe/IrelandJUDICIAL-SYSTEM.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007).

Israel

Italy

Judges are appointed by the Judicial

Eli M. Salzberger, Judicial
Appointments and Promotions
in Israel: Constitution,Law

After competitive examination, judges
are appointed for training. Following
successful training and another
examination, the judicial council posts
vacant positions, with those candidates
scoring the in
highest
receiving their
preference
position.

242.
Consiglio Superiore della
CngiSurioe dla
Magistratura, The Italian
JudicialwSystc
http://www.csm.irldocumenti%
20pdf/sistema%20giudiziario
%20italiano/inglese.pdf.

Selection Committee.

and Politics, in APPOINTING
JUDGES, supra note 278, at
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Jamaica

Selection Method
The Chief Justice and the President of
the Court of Appeal are appointed by
the Governor General on the
recommendation of the Prime Minister
after consultation with the Leader of
Opposition. Judges of the Supreme
Court and Judges of the Court of
Appeal are appointed by the Governor
General on the recommendation of the
Judicial Services Commission.
Resident Magistrates are appointed by
the Governor General and the Judicial
Services Commission.

Japan

Kazakhstan

Japan has a career judiciary that has
begins with entry to the Legal Training
Institute following a competitive
examination. Following graduation,
judges apply to the Supreme Court for
appointment. Formally, the cabinet
makes appointments to the judiciary
following recommendation by the
Supreme Court.
Supreme Court Justices are
recommended by the High Judicial
Council to the President, who proposes
the candidate to the Senate, who then
elects the judges. Regional court
judges are appointed by the President,
after recommendation by the High
Judicial Council. The President
appoints all lower court judges, based
on proposals by the Minister of Justice
and the Justice Qualification
Collegium.

Kenya

Judges are appointed by the Head of
State, acting on the advice of the
Judicial Service Commission.

Kiribati

Judges at all levels are appointed by
the president.

Korea, North

Justices of the highest court areState,
appointed by the Supreme People's
stndig comitee.
standing
committee.
Assembly'sAsseblys

References

Jamaican Ministry of Justice,
The Courts of Jamaica,
http://www.moj.gov.jm/courts
.ojgov .
htt://ww
(last visited Apr. 9, 2007).

John 0. Haley, The Japanese
Judiciary:Maintaining
Integrity, Autonomy, and
Public Trust, WASH. U. SCH.
OF LAW, 2005, 5,
http://www.wulaw.wustl.edu/u
ploadedFiles/Faculty/HaleyfTheJapane
seJudiciarySSRN.pdf.
American Bar Association,
Central European and Eurasian
Law Initiative, Legal
Information for Kazakhstan,
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/co
untries/kazakhstan/legalinfo.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
Isaac Nyangeri, Kenya: The
Judiciary - Room for
Improvement,
http://ospiti.peacelink.it/anbbia/nr337/e12.html (last visited
Apr. 11, 2007).
CIA World Factbook, Kiribati,
https://www.cia.gov/cia/public
ations/factbook/printL/kr.html.
United States Department of
Background Note: North
Korea,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bg
n/2792.htm (last visited Apr.
10, 2007).
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Korea, South

Kosovo

Kuwait

Kyrgyzstan

Selection Method
The Chief Justice and the Justices of
the Supreme Court are appointed by
the President of the Republic and
require confirmation by the National
Assembly. Other judges are appointed
by the Chief Justice with the consent
of the Council of Supreme Court
Justices.
The Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial
Council (KJPC) recommends judges
and prosecutors for appointment to the
Special Representative of the UN
Secretary General (SRSG). The SRSG
then appoints judges from lists of
candidates recommended by the KJPC
and endorsed by the General
Assembly.
The Emir appoints judges in the
regular courts after recommendation of
the Justice Ministry.
Judges of the Supreme Court and the
Constitutional Court are appointed by
the legislature on the recommendation
of the president. Lower court judges
are appointed by the president on the
recommendation of the National
Council on Legal Affairs.

Laos

Latvia

Judges at all levels are appointed by
the National Assembly Standing
Committee.
Candidates for the Supreme Court are
nominated by the President of the
Supreme Court after recommendation
by the Judicial Qualification Board,
and appointed by Parliament. Lower
court judges are nominated by the
Minister of Justice and appointed by
the Parliament for unlimited terms.

J

References

Supreme Court of Korea,
Judges,
http:llwww.scourt.go.kr/scourt
_en/organization/judges/index.
html (last visited Apr. 9,
2007).
American Bar Association,
Central European and Eurasian
Law Initiative, Legal
Information for Kosovo,
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/co
untries/kosovo/legalinfo.html
(last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
Encyclopedia of Nations,
Kuwait: Judicial System,
http://www.nationsencyclopedi
a.com/Asia-andOceania/Kuwalt-JUDICIALSYSTEM.html (last visited
Apr. 9, 2007).
CIA World Factbook,
Kyrgyzstan,
https://www.cia.gov/cia/public
ations/factbook/geos/kg.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
LAOS
CONST. art. 67 available
at
http://www.laoembassy.com/n
ews/constitution/body.htm
Open Society Institute,
Monitoring the EU Accession
Process: Judicial Independence
in Latvia, 252-53 (2001)
available at
http://www.eumap.org/reports/
2001/judicial/sections/latvia/ju
dicial-latvia.pdf
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Lebanon

Selection Method

The Supreme Judicial Council appoints
judges.

References
United Nations Development
Programme, Programme on
Governance in the Arab
Region,
Judiciary: Lebanon,
http://www.pogar.org/countrie
s/judiciary.asp?cid=9 (last
visited Apr. 9, 2007).

Libya

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

The General People's Congress elects
the Supreme Court President and other
members of the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Council for Judicial
Authority handles matters of
and discipline.
appointment, transfer acid=

Parliament nominates judges and the
Prince appoints the judges.

The President appoints all judges.

Luxembourg
Luxembourg

for all courts are appointed for
Judges
life by the monarch.

Macedonia

The General Assembly appoints judges
after nomination by the Republic
Judicial Council (RJC).

United Nations Development
Programme, Programme on
Governance in the Arab
Region, Judiciary: Libya,
http://www.undppogar.org/countries/j udiciary.asp
10 (last visited Apr. 9,
2007).

United States Department of
State, Background Note:
Liechtenstein, March 2007,
http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbg
n/9403.htm (last visited Apr. 9,
2007).
CIA World Factbook,
Lithuania,
https://www.cia.gov/cia/public
ations/factbook/geosllh.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
CIA World Factbook,
Luxembourg,
https://www.cia.gov/cia/pubc
hts/wwcagvcapbi
ations/factbook/geos/lu.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
American Bar Association,
Central European and Eurasian
Legal
Law Initiative,
Information
for Macedonia,
I tionorceoi,
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/co
un-

tries/macedonia/legalinfo.html

Madagascar

Presidents of the courts are appointed
by the Council of Ministers from a list
of candidates compiled by the Justice
Minister, in consultation with the High
Council of the Judiciary. Other judges
are appointed by decree as proposed by
the Justice Minister.

(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).

Mathieu Cdlien Ramasiarisolo,
Madagascar: The Judiciary An Absolute Necessity,
http://ospiti.peacelink.it/anbbiatr337/e3.html (last visited
Apr. 9, 2007).
Apr._9,_2007).
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Malawi

Malaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

Mauritania

Mexico

Selection Method

References

The Chief Justice is appointed by the
President and confirmed by the

Patrick Mawaya, Malawi: The
Judiciary - On a Test Run,

General Assembly. The President also
appoints other judges are after
recommendation by the Judicial
Service Commission.
Judges are appointed by the Head of
State on
apine the
y hPrime
the
Minister
after
consulting
Conference of Rulers.

http://ospiti.peacelink.it/anbbia/nr337/el4.html (last visited
Apr. 9, 2007).

All the judges of the High Court, the
Aihet cugsi the Hhcour, the
in the
country,and
andcan
thebe
highest
court are
appointed
lower courts
dismissed by the President.

The Malaysian Court Website,
The Malaysian Judiciary,
http://www.kehakiman.gov.my
/courts/maljudiciary.shtml (last
visited Apr. 9, 2007).

Asian Centre for Human
Rights, Maldives: Judiciary
Under the President's Thumb,
http://www.achrweb.org/briefi
ngpapers/Maldives-BP0107.htm#_Tocl60430320

(last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
United States Department of
State, Background Note: Mali,
February 2007,
The Ministry of Justice appoints
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bg
judges.
n/2828.htm (last visited Apr. 9,
2007).
MALTA
CONST.
art. 96, 100,
available
at http://www.legalJudges and magistrates are appointed
aailawcnsttptwlnthe
of
advice
the
on
by the president
primeminiter.malta.com/law/constitution8hm
prime minister.
8.htm.
Judges are appointed by the Minister
of Justice and the Higher Council of
Judges. Both bodies are directly
appointed by the executive branch.
Lower court judges are appointed by
the Federal Judicial Council (CFJ).
The CFJ is composed of the country's
chief justice, one judge, two district
magistrates, two members chosen by
the Senate, and one member appointed
by the president.

Aliou BA & Sidi Ould SbaY,
Mauritania: Justice - From
One Reform to Another,
http://ospiti.peacelink.it/anbbia/nr337/el6.html (last visited
Apr. 9, 2007).
Jodi Finkel, JudicialReform as
InsurancePolicy: Mexico in
the 1990s, 47 LATIN
AMERICAN POL. & Soc'y, 87,
91-92 (2005).
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Micronesia,
Federated
States of

Moldova

Selection Method

Justices are appointed by the president,
with the advice and consent of the
legislature.

The judges of the Supreme Court are
appointed by the Parliament after
being nominated by the Superior
Council of Magistracy. Lower court
judges are appointed by the President
after nomination by the Superior
Council of Magistracy.

Monaco

Mongolia

Montenegro

References
Encyclopedia of Nations,
Micronesia, Federated States
of: Judicial System,
http://www.nationsencyclopedi
a.com/Asia-andOceania/MicronesiaFederated-States-ofJUDICIAL-SYSTEM.html
(last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
American Bar Association,
Central European and Eurasian
Law Initiative, Legal
Information for Moldova,
http://www.abanet.org/ceelilco
untries/moldova/legalinfo.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).

The Supreme Court is composed of ten
members, five full members and five
deputy members. All are appointed by
the Prince after nomination by the
National Council, the Council of State,
the Crown Council, the court of appeal
and the court of first instance. These
five institutions all nominate a full
member. Only the National Council
and the Council of State also put
forward a deputy.

Official Website of Monaco,
The Supreme Court,
http://www.gouv.mc/devwwwl
wwwnew.nsf/1909$/efcb8af3d
5f55567c1256fa3004fcc3fgb?
OpenDocument&5Gb (last
visited Apr. 9, 2007).

The President of the Mongolia
appoints
judges after
proposal of the
Judicial General
Council.

Mongolian State Law on the
Courts,
art. 6 cl. 2 availableat
http://www.asuult.net/nemesis/
mongolianjudiciary/.

After recommendation by the Judicial
Council, the National Assembly
appoints judges to the courts.

Judicial Reform Index for
Montenegro, American Bar
Association Central and East
EuropeanL a nitia 2
available at
http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/g
roups/public/documents/UNT

Mozambique

Namibia

Judges are appointed by the President
of the Republic after consultation with
the Supreme Council of the Judiciary.
The Assembly of the Republic
appoints the other judges to the
Supreme Court.
The President appoints all Judges to
the Supreme Court and the High Court
on the recommendation of the Judicial
Service Commission.

C/UNPAN017566.pdf.

MOZAMBIQUE CONST. art. 170,
availableat
http://confinder.richmond.edu/
admin/docs/moz.pdf.
NAMIBIA CONST. art. 82
availableat
http://www.orusovo.connamc
on/.
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Nepal

Netherlands

New Zealand

Selection Method
The King appoints all judges on the
recommendation of the Judicial
Council.

All judicial appointments are made by
the Crown.
The Governor-General makes
appointments to the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeal and High Court on the
advice of the Attorney-General. The
Governor-General appoints judges to
district courts on the advice of the
Attorney-General, who receives
recommendations from the Chief
District Court Judge and the Secretary
for Justice.

Nigeria

Palestine

Panama

Papua New
Guinea

The National Judicial Council advises
the President on appointments to the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal,
and the Federal High Court. State
court judges are also appointed by the
state governors after recommendation
by the National Judicial Council.
The High Judicial Council appoints,
supervises, transfers, and dismisses
judges.
The nine Supreme Court justices are
appointed by the president subject to
the advice and consent of the
Legislative Assembly. Supreme Court
justices appoint the judges of the
superior courts who then appoint the
circuit court judges in their respective
jurisdictions.
The Chief Justice is appointed by the
Head of State acting on the advice of
the National Executive Council. Other
Judges are appointed by the Judicial
and Legal Services Commission.

References
United States Department of
State, Background Note:
Nepal, October 2006,
NepalwOctber/p6,
http://www.state.gov/r/Pa/ei/bg
n/5283.htm (last visited Apr. 9,
2007).
United States Department of
State, Background Note: The
Netherlands, January 2007,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bg
n/3204.htm (last visited Apr. 9,
2007).
Courts of New Zealand, The
Judges: Judicial Appointments,
http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/
a
itd Aproi9,m2007.
ml (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
The Nigeria Judiciary, Legal
Institutions: National Judicial
Council,
http://www.nigeriajudiciary.or
gtnjc.htm (last visited Apr. 10,
2007).
United Nations Development
Programme, Programme on
Governance in the Arab
Region, Judiciary: Palestine,
http://www.pogar.org/countrie
s/judiciary.asp?cid=14 (last
visited Apr. 10, 2007).
Encyclopedia of Nations,
Panama: Judicial System,
http://www.nationsencyclopedi
a.com/Americas/PanamaJUDICIAL-SYSTEM.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007).

PAPUA NEW GUINEA CONST.
art.169-70.
NW9e70S
art.
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Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

4:

WORLD SELECTION METHODS

Selection Method
The Supreme Court appoints lower

The Jurist, Paraguay: Courts &
Judgments,

court
judges and magistrates
after
recommendation
by the magistrate's
council.

http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/
paraguay.htm (last visited Apr.
10, 2007).

The Senate confirms justices that have
been nominated by the President based
on recommendations by the National
Justice Council.
The President appoints judges of the
Supreme Court and lower courts from
a list of candidates submitted by the
Philippine Judicial and Bar Council.

Poland

Most justices enter the profession
through an apprenticeship. Other
judges are appointed by the President
after nomination by the National
Council of the Judiciary.

Portugal

Judges are recruited through
competitive exams followed by a
course of initial training at the Centre
for Judicial Studies (Centro de
Estudos Judiciarios). Following
training, The Superior Council of the
Judiciary has the power to appoint,
assign, transfer and promote the
judges.

Qatar

Romania

References

The High Judicial Council recommends judicial candidates to the Emir
who then appoints the judge.

Judges are appointed by the president
on the recommendation of the Superior
Council of Magistrates.

Encyclopedia of Nations, Peru:
Judicial System,
http://www.nationsencyclopedi
a.comlAmericas/PeruJUDICIAL-SYSTEM.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
The Jurist, Philippines: Courts
& Judgments,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/
philippines.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2007).
Open Society Institute,
Monitoring the EU Accession
Process, Judicial Capacity in
Poland, 158 (2002) available
at
http://www.eumap.orglreportsl
2002/judicial/international/sect
ions/poland/2002-j_
poland.pdf.
International Commission of
Jurists, Portugal: Attacks on
Justice, Aug. 27, 2002,
JuticeiAug.n
2002,
http://www.icj.orglnews.php3?
visited Apr. 10, 2007).
United Nations Development
Programme, Programme on
Governance in the Arab
Region, Judiciary: Qatar,
http://www.pogar.org/countrie
s/judiciary.asp?cid=15 (last
visited Apr. 10, 2007).
American Bar Association,
Central European and Eurasian
Law Initiative, Legal
Information for Romania,
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/co
untries/romania/legalinfo.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
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Russia

Judges of the Constitutional Court,
Supreme Court and High Arbitrazh
Court are all appointed by the Council
of the Federation after nomination by
the president.

Rwanda

The Higher Judiciary Council appoints
j
ger

References
American Bar Association,
Central European and Eurasian
Law Initiative, Legal
Information for Russia,
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/co
untries/russialegalinfo.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
Charles Ntampaka, Rwanda:
Justice - Seeking Its Path,
http://ospiti.peacelink.it/anbbia/nr337/e18.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2007).

Saudi Arabia

The Supreme Judicial Council
appoints, promotes, and transfers
judges.

United Nations Development
Programme, Programme on
Governance in the Arab
Region, Judiciary: Saudi
Arabia,
http://www.pogar.org/countrie
s/judiciary.asp?cid=16 (last
visited Apr. 11, 2007).

Senegal

Serbia

Sierra Leone

Judges are appointed after recommendation by the Minister of Justice.

The High Judicial Council nominates
all judges who are then confirmed and
formally appointed by the General
Assembly. Federal Constitutional
Court and Federal Court judges are
nominated by the President appointed
by the Federal Assembly.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court is appointed by the President on
the recommendation of the Judicial
and Legal Service Commission and
after approval of Parliament. The
other Supreme Court justices are
appointed by the President after
recommendation by the Judicial and
Legal Service Commission. The
judges of lower courts are appointed
by the Chief Justice after consultation
with the Judicial and Legal Service
Commission.

Encyclopedia of Nations,
Senegal: Judicial System,
http://www.nationsencyclopedi
a.com/Africa/SenegalJUDICIAL-SYSTEM.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
American Bar Association,
Central European and Eurasian
Law Initiative, Legal
Information for Serbia,
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/co
untries/serbia/legalinfo.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2007).

SIERRA LEONE CONST.

[Vol. 27

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

TABLE

Country

4:

WORLD SELECTION METHODS

Selection Method

Singapore

Judges are appointed by the President,
acting on the advice of the Prime
Minister.

Slovenia

The Judicial Council appoints judges
after consulting with court personnel
councils and the Ministry of Justice.

Somaliland

South Africa

The President appoints the justices of
the Supreme Court after consultation
with the Judicial Commission. The
Chief Justice also has to be approved
by the Parliament. Lower court judges
are appointed by the Judicial
Commission.
The President appoints justices on the
recommendation of the Judicial

Service Commission.

Spain

Judges are appointed by the Consejo
General del Poder Judicial (Judicial
Council).

Sudan

The President appoints all judges,
including those of the Supreme Court
on the recommendation of the National
Judiciary Service Commission (NJSC).
The
President of
Theapsients
o the
tge Southern
Southern Sudan
Sudan.
appoints all judges in Southern Sudan.

References
The Supreme Court of
Singapore, Judges, Judicial
Commissioners, and
Registrars,
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg
/default.aspx?pglD=40 (last
visited Apr. 10, 2007).
Open Society Institute,
Monitoring the EU Accession
Process, Judicial Capacity in
Slovenia 212-213, (2002),
availableat
http://www.eumap.org/reports/
2002/judiciallintemational/sect
ions/slovenia/2002_j-slovenia.
pdf.

107,108.

Francois Du Bois, Judicial
Selection in Post-Apartheid
South Africa, in APPOINTING

JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL

POWER 280, 281 (Kate
Malleson & Peter H. Russel,
eds., 2006).
The World Bank, Governing
the Justice System: Spain's
Judicial Council, June 2001,
available at
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/pr
em/PREMNotes/premnote54.p
df.
United Nations Development
Programme, Programme on
Governance in the Arab
Region, Judiciary: Sudan,
http://www.pogar.org/countrie
s/judiciary.asp?cid=l 8 (last
visited Apr. 9, 2007).
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Syria

Selection Method

The Supreme Judicial Council
appoints, dismisses, and transfers
judges.

References
United Nations Development
Programme, Programme on
Governance in the Arab
Region, Judiciary: Syria,
http://www.pogar.org/countrie
s/judiciary.asp?cid=19 (last
visited Apr. 9, 2007).

Tajikistan

The President appoints judges who are
later confirmed by Parliament.
The judges of the high courts are
appointed by the President after

Tanzania

Thailand

consultation with the Judicial Service
Commission; Justices of the Court of
Appeal are appointed by the President
after consultation with the Chief
Justice.
Judges are recruited by the Judicial
Commission and are appointed by the
King.
After completing a competitive
examination, judges follow a two-year
training course at the College for

Togo

Trinidad and
Tobago

Senior Civil Servants. The Council of
Judges (CSM) then recommends
judges for appointment to the Justice
Minister, who then makes the
appointment.
The Chief Justice is appointed by the
President after consultation with the
Prime Minister and the Leader of the
Opposition. Other Supreme Court
judges are appointed by the President
on the advice of the Judicial and Legal
Service Commission. The Judicial and
Legal Service Commission appoints
magistrates and all other judicial
officers.

Library of Congress - Federal
Research Division, Country
Profile: Tajikstan, January 13
(2007), availableat
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pr
ofiles/Tajikistan.pdf
TANZANIA CONST. a

118 availableat

109,

http://www.tanzania.go.tziima
ges/constitutioneng.pdf.
Thailand Office of the
Judiciary, The Judiciary of
Thailand,
http://www.judiciary.go.th/eng
/thejudiciary.htm (last visited
Apr. 9, 2007).
Paschal K. Dotchevi, Togo:
http://ospiti.peacelink.it/anbbia/nr337/e2l .html (last visited
Apr. 11, 2007).

Judiciary of the Republic of
Trinidad and Tobago,
Appointment of the Judiciary,
http://www.ttlawcourts.org/app
ointment.htm (last visited Apr.
9, 2007).
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Selection Method

Tunisia

Magistrates are nominated by the
President upon the recommendation of
the Supreme Judicial Council.

Turkey

Turkey has a civil service judiciary
where students choose to train for a
judicial career early in the legal
education process. After graduation
from judicial school, they begin their
apprenticeship in eastern Turkey,
moving westward region by region
throughout their career.

Turkmenistan

The president appoints the Supreme
Court, Velayat, Ashgabat, Etrap and
City Court judge, although the
Supreme Court Chairman has to
approved by the General Assembly.
The President appoints the other
judicial officers on the recommenda-

tion of the Supreme Court Chairman.

Uganda

The President appoints the Chief
Justice. Other judges are also
appointed by the President with the
recommendation of the Judicial
Service Commission. Magistrates are
appointed by the Judicial Service

[

References

art. 66
available at
http://www.pogar.org/publicati
ons/judiciary/nbrown/tunisia.ht
ml.
TUNISIA CONST.

Jurist: Legal Intelligence,
Turkey: Courts & Judgements,
http://urist.law.pitt.edu/world/
turist(lavpited
turkcor4a.htm (last visited
Apr. 11, 2007).
American Bar Association,
Central European and Eurasian
Law Initiative, Legal
Information for Turkmenistan,
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/co
untries/turkmenistan/legalinfo.ht
ml (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
Republic of Uganda, Courts of
Judicature: Judicial Officers,
http://www.judicature.go.ug/ju
dicialphp (last visited Apr. 11,
2007).

Commission.

Ukraine

Those interested in judicial
appointment have to pass a
qualification examination. Those who
pass and are recommended by the
qualification commission are then
reviewed by the High Judicial Council
(HCJ). Those receiving recommendation from the HCJ are presented to the
President for final appointment.

United Arab
Emirates

Federal Supreme Court judges are all
appointed by the UAE president with
the approval of the Supreme Federal
Council. Other federal judges are
appointed by the UAE president after
nomination by the minister of justice.

American Bar Association,
Central and East European
Law Initiative, Judicial Reform
Index for Ukraine 3 (2002),
availableat
www.abanet.org/ceeli/publicati
ons/jri/jriukraine.pdf.
United Nations Development
Programme, Programme on
Governance in the Arab
Region, Arab Judicial
Emirates,
http://www.pogar.orgpublicati
ons/judiciary/nbrown/uae.html
I (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
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TABLE 4: WORLD SELECTION METHODS

Country

United

Kingdom

Uzbekistan

Selection Method

Judges are recommended by judicial
commissions with final appointment

Kate Malleson, The New
JudicialAppointments
Commission in England and
Wales: New Wine in New

Constitutional Affairs.

IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER

by the Secretary of State for

Supreme Court judges are nominated
by the president and confirmed by the
Oliy Majlis (legislature). Lower court
judges are appointed by the president.
The Chief Justice is appointed by the
President after consultation with the

Vanuatu

Venezuela

References

Prime Minister and the Leader of the
Opposition. Other judges are
appointed by the President acting on
the advice of the Judicial Service
Commission.
Judges are appointed and swor in by
the Supreme Tribunal of Justice.

Bottles, in APPOINTING JUDGES

39, 46 (Kate Malleson & Peter
H. Russel, eds., 2006).
Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia, Uzbekistan: Judiciary,
http://ericarta.msn.com/encyclo
PCdia_761551989_6fUzbekistan.
html (last visited Apr. 11,
2007).
VANUATU CONST. art. 47(2),

49 (3), available at
http://www.vanuatu.gov.vu/go
vernment/library/constitution.html.
Lauren Castaldi, Judicial
Independence Threatened in
Venezuela: The Removal of
Venezuelan Judges and the
Complicationsof Rule of Law
Reform, 37 GEO. J. INT'LL.

Vietnam

477, 493 (2006).
Brian J.M. Quinn, Vietnam's
The Chief Judge of the Supreme
The
Judehie
o theSupemeContinuingLegal Reform:
Gaining Legl Rerm:
People's Court appoints judges
according to the 2002 Law on the
Gaining Control Over The
Courts,4 Asian-Pac. L. &
Organization of the People's Court.
OgitnotPolsot

Yemen
Yemen

Judges are appointed by the Supreme
Judicial Council.4,ailbet

Pol'y J. 431, 452-453 (2003).

World Bank, Republic of
Yemen: Judicial and Legal
System Building
Block, 2000,
4, available at
http://lnwebl 8.worldbank.org/
mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/Ju
dicial/$File/BB-5.pdf.

Zambia

The Supreme Court justices are
appointed by the President subject to
ratification by the National Assembly.
Other judges are recommended by the

Judicial Service Commission and
appointed by the President, subject to

ratification by the National Assembly.

ZAMBIA CONST. art. 93, 95.
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TABLE 4: WORLD SELECTION METHODS

Country

Selection Method

Zimbabwe

The Chief Justice and other judges of
the Supreme Court and the High Court
are appointed by the President after
consultation with the Judicial Service
Commission.

References

ZIMBABWE CONST. s. 84

